the ALTERNATIVE

May, 1973 Vol. 6 No. 8 Price (.25)



Starting a Cold War

Notes on a Peculiar Conflict

Dexter Perkins *Robert Pfaltzgraff* *James Grant*

Robert Ferrell *Bud Folsom* *Robert Maddox*

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the ALTERNATIVE

to bare the witness and the truth

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Published remarkably without regard to race, color, creed, or (most redundantly of all) national origin — and yes, sex, even sex.

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The Alternative was founded in 1924 by George Nathan and Truman Newberry over a cheap domestic beer in McSorley's Old Ale House. Originally published on rest-room walls, only since 1967 has it come under purview of the Saturday Evening Club which publishes it from October through June. Subscriptions cost $4.00, and all correspondence (manuscripts, subscriptions, threatening letters, federal grants, etc.) should be sent to **The Alternative,** c/o The Establishment, R.R. 11, Box 360, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, Continental U.S.A.

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☆The Continuing Crisis☆

● In girding for a constitutional struggle with the President over war powers, spending authority, administration security, headlines, prime time, and limelight, Congress mutilated itself. On March 7 the House decided to reform committee meetings by opening them to the public during markup sessions, a measure the Senate had earlier rejected. Shortly thereafter House Democrats diluted the seniority system, while the House established a panel to mull over changes in committee structure. And in a final moment of inspired reform the House decided to allow floor amendments to be festooned to tax and trade bills, assuring some stupendous salad days for the industrious lobbyists of Capitol Hill!

● Throughout the entire month the nation thrilled to the Ellsberg Affair, presently being staged in Los Angeles. The terrible confrontation at Wounded Knee continues. And Mr. John Lindsay, Lord Mayor of New York and lifetime opponent of public executions, has decided not to run for re-election. Mr. Rudy Mortgarten, a seventy-year-old hermit, has been found living in New York's Central Park. And on the last day of the month Mr. Muhammad Ali was beaten in a professional prize fight with Ken Norton — as fate would have it, Mr. Norton broke the sententious Mr. Ali's jaw.

● On the evening of March 10 the Governor of Bermuda and his pet Great Dane mysteriously passed away, and on that same day President Nixon said he would ask Congress for mandatory life sentences for drug entrepreneurs having prior convictions. Later in the month the President asked Congress to revise the definition of legal insanity, making it easier for sane persons to kill people. The rising zeal for reform also spread to San Francisco where, having been moved by the high incidence of indecorous suicides, Dr. Warren Briggs, the noted Methodist cleric, has suggested that clinics be developed to guarantee "the right to commit suicide in dignity" — incidentally, this somewhat obscure right had heretofore reposed unknown even to the Warren Court.

● There were many elections during the month, the most important being held in France, Argentina, and progressive Chile where the rate of inflation was the world's highest last year. In France the Gaullist-led coalition achieved a somewhat larger majority than expected. A Peronist government triumphed in Argentina. And in Chile the Marxist held its own and got a bit more. Liechtenstein again voted down women's suffrage, and back in the States the controversial Equal Rights Amendment gained one state's ratification only to lose that of another.

(continued on page 28)

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Editorial

The Nixon Budget

The battle over President Nixon's proposed 1973-74 budget is one of the most important domestic issues to arise in at least a decade and its resolution will have a profound impact on public policy for years to come.

Many proponents of fiscal discipline, although disappointed that the budget will show another deficit ($12.7 billion in FY 1974 as compared to $24.8 billion in FY 1973), and a whopping $18.9 billion increase (to $268.7 billion in FY 1974 from $249.8 billion this year), feel that the thrust of this budget is in a conservative direction. In their view it is not so much that the rate of spending is lessened or that the deficit is halved, it is, rather, that for the first time since the New Deal major social welfare programs have been reduced or eliminated.

The symbolic significance of this action is undeniably great, as evidenced by the outraged howls which have been coming from the "education-poverty-industrial complex," to use Representative Edith Green's phrase. To them the Nixon budget is as important in breaking fiscal precedent as was the Warren Court in shattering judicial precedent. Among other functions, the budget is a political tool which serves to shape the terms of public policy debate. To those who have dominated the debate and given direction to this process for most of the last forty years, a debate over "reordering priorities" along Mr. Nixon's proposed lines is unthinkable.

Especially galling to the literati must have been Mr. Nixon's invocation of "compassion" and "equality" as arguments for *cutting* many Great Society programs. In his message on human resources, the President was both blunt and forthright. He described many of the 1960s antipoverty programs as "utopian," pointedly noting that: "The money which left Washington in a seemingly inexhaustible flood was reduced to a mere trickle by the time it had filtered through all the layers of bureaucrats, consultants and social workers, and finally reached those whom it was supposed to help."

He noted that too much money went to those who were supposed to help the needy, and not enough to the needy. "Those who make a profession out of poverty got fat; the taxpayer got stuck with the bill; and the disadvantaged themselves got little but broken promises," the President said. He concluded that: We must do better . . . . The American people deserve compassion that works — not simply compassion that means well. They deserve programs that say yes to human needs by saying no to paternalism, social exploitation and waste."

However much the denizens of Manhattan and Cambridge, Mass. may regard Mr. Nixon as merely a usurper, or pesky interloper in the nation's march toward egalitarianism, it is quite clear that the President regards his smashing electoral triumph, at least in large measure, as a vote by Americans against ever-expanding bureaucratic control over their lives and pocketbooks. Although the media may still dote on the esoteric and exotic tax reforms concocted in various think-tanks, the majority of working people are not interested. Instead, they are, quite sensibly, revolting against higher taxes.

That this apparently elementary fact should escape many observers is somewhat perplexing. The problem is not an extraordinarily recondite one; in fact, some simple arithmetic casts it into sharp relief. Paul McCracken, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Nixon, has recently stated that "from 1965 to 1968 the rise in federal, state and local outlays (on a national accounts basis) was equal to almost 57 percent of the rise in national income, and the figure for the period 1968 to 1972 (first quarter) was 48 percent." *The Wall Street Journal* reports that federal government expenditures alone now account for over 21 percent of the U.S. Gross National Product, with the percentage still growing.

Seen in this light it is clear that the President's budget is an attempt to keep faith with his constituency. If a tax rise is to be averted and inflation checked, as the President has pledged, then fiscal discipline is needed. Combine the necessity for fiscal responsibility with the growing awareness that government has, in many instances, become unresponsive, unmanageable and counterproductive, and the proposed budget should be interpreted as a start, in Mr. Nixon's words, "to get government off your back and out of your pocket."

The proposed budget is especially important not only because of its symbolic and precedent-breaking nature, but because on close inspection it is a budget with teeth. It provides, among other things, for cuts in current spending of $3.1 billion in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, $1.2 billion in the Department of Agriculture, $300 million from the Environmental Protection Agency, $295 million from the Department of Transportation, and $242 million from economic foreign aid. In addition there are even greater future budget savings projected. The budget projects sharp cuts or "freezes" in such venerable institutions as farm subsidies, low-income housing, the Office of Economic Opportunity (the showcase of the Great Society), and a wide variety of pork barrel programs. In addition, Medicare recipients would pay more for their benefits.

This attempt to regulate conditions at the public trough violates the Golden Rule of Politics: Thou shalt never reduce benefits. Consequently, reaction to the proposed cuts has been both swift and predictable. The poverty lobby, its academic, congressional, and media allies, and a whole host of special-interest groups have launched an all-out war on the budget. Even before the budget was announced, a broad coalition of what are euphemistically called "citizens groups," including the National Urban League, National Tenants Organization, League of Women Voters, and U.S. Conference of Mayors, to name a few, began attacking the expected cuts.

As cuts and impounding of funds were announced by the Administration, an evergrowing chorus of criticism was raised by congressional liberals, large segments of the media, and conservative legislators whose districts are affected. *Time* stated that the budget "in effect summons the U.S. to bury the Great Society," while House Speaker Carl Albert (D.-Okla.) called it "a vehicle to make the rich richer." Senator Harrison Williams (D. -N.J.) claimed it was "contemptuous of the real needs of the American people," and Senator Edward Kennedy (D. -Mass.) stated it was "good news for the big defense contractors and bad news for the average citizen." Senator Gale McGee (D. -Wyo.), threatened to block all funds for farm programs and Agriculture Department employees unless the Administration relented on farm cuts, saying "That means zilch — no money." Within a week after the budget was released the Senate showed its dedication to fiscal responsibility by voting overwhelmingly to boost airport subsidies, and to pass a half a billion dollar "pork barrel" rivers, harbor, and flood control bill. The House, not to be outdone, voted 251 to 142 to restore the quarter billion dollar Rural Environmental Assistance Program (REAP), which the Nixon Administration had eliminated from the budget (and which every president since Truman has tried to abolish).

The strategy of both sides is now clear. Congressional Democrats are virtually united against the cuts and, aided by a large segment of the media and a part of the congressional Republican bloc, will attack Administration cuts in "starved" social welfare programs. Based on preliminary indications, this coalition will have the votes to restore many affected social programs and to reduce defense appropriations, possibly by as much as $5 billion (Senator John McClellan (D. -Ark.), chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee, has said he hopes his committee will reduce defense spending by as much as last year's $5 billion trimming). The coalition will then attempt to shift these defense cuts "savings" into the threatened Great Society programs. The Administration will counter this ploy by vetoing increased spending bills, and will then have to rely on having its vetoes upheld, although it has even threatened impounding if overridden on vetoes. It is at this point that the battle will be won or lost. In the Senate the liberals are clearly in the saddle and Administration hopes are bleak. In the House however, the chances for sustaining possible vetoes are considerably better. Minority Leader

MOVING IN SEPTEMBER?

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Gerald Ford (R.-Mich.) has predicted that if the Administration stands firm, enough Republicans and conservative Democrats will vote to sustain.

To their credit, the intellectual and congressional fathers of the Great Society have recognized what they perceive as an attempt to redirect American politics and they are now conducting a highly publicized, well-coordinated campaign to stop it. Their response has been reinforced by that ultimate in political bliss, a marriage between principle (i.e., the desire for centralized social welfare programs) and politics (the cuts adversely affect important constituencies, and there is a desire to gear up for the next elections.)

Administration supporters haven't been blessed by any such political union, and their response to date has been sporadic, fragmented, and tentative.

Many fiscally conservative legislators are now torn between desires to reassert fiscal discipline, to cut back on ill-conceived and unworkable social programs, and to bring some order and control to the bureaucratic hydra, on the one hand, and, on the other, the natural urges to avoid offending constituents who might be affected by cuts and to reassert congressional authority *vis-a-vis* the Executive branch. The impoundment controversy has unfortunately muddied the waters and caused even greater division among the President's Capitol Hill allies.

It is pertinent to the budget battle to note that all great political changes occur when, due to a variety of factors, ideas and events meet. This is usually expressed by the phrase "an idea whose time has come." Mr. Nixon apparently believes that such a combination of events and ideas has occurred and is attempting to harness the much heralded "taxpayers revolt," with its signs of individual anomie which usually indicate imminent changes in political and social institutions, to help create his "New Federalism." He has embarked on an attempt not only to restore fiscal discipline, but to take first steps toward redirecting American political life.

The President realizes that such opportunities occur rarely in political life and must be exploited promptly and skillfully if they are to succeed. He also understands that this struggle will be won or lost by public pressure created by ideas. His series of radio messages on the budget and the state of the union is an attempt to maximize the intellectual impact of Administration proposals for localism and economy in government, and thereby to win round one of the contest.

In this first phase of the struggle, the main participants will be academicians, journalists, and members of the media. The Administration will rely heavily on the work done by the Milton Friedmans, Yale Brozens, *Public Interests*, and many others. The public policy philosophy they represent may now be about to bear fruit, after being neglected for so long. At a minimum it will now be more fully aired than ever before. The question now is which side will do the best research on a vast array of government programs and policy, and which side will demonstrate superior will and ability in hammering its message home to the public. On exactly these considerations does the success of Mr. Nixon's domestic policy, and the philosophy upon which it is based, rest.

Wayne H. Valis

An American Family Meets Ozzie and Harriet

The life and times of the William C. Loud family have become an important part of the popular culture, have in fact satisfied one of our fondest expectations. By playing themselves in a theatrical situation, the Louds have automatically fulfilled that consistency of behavior we have always demanded of our actors, a demand which reaches for a mutual antagonism with which we are ultimately most comfortable. Even when *An American Family* appears on the Dick Cavett Show to defend itself against its own series, the event merely adds another episode. They are an event themselves, the Louds, unable to extricate themselves from the event they are, unable, too, to perceive the impossibility.

At a time when questions concerning censorship are being put so ardently in various journals of opinion, it is interesting how smoothly the Louds pass by. People who debate the inspirational elements of *Deep Throat* and *Last Tango in Paris* do not include *An American Family* in their conception of debilitating and tasteless influences. The reason may be that the Louds are not naked in these episodes, not naked in the sense of performing without clothing. Their intimacies, where they occur, are merely verbal, thus evidently more tolerable, despite the fact that once a week we all sit down to watch an organization of human beings deliberately set out to murder each other.

Of course, murder is a form of intimacy we tend to regard as sterile. The quality of excitement it bears suggests no likelihood of reproduction, so despite the accuracies achieved by television *verite*, we view most aspects of the Louds' behavior as the antics of an American family of another country. On the other hand, public criticism of *An American Family* has been couched almost entire in personal terms. One judges the success of each episode, and the whole series, by deciding whether one likes the Louds, not the program or the idea of it, a decision which hinges on our surface identifications with, and correspondences to, the family, and eventually becomes refined to the point where we judge some Louds better than other Louds — healthier, more honest, more entertaining — until finally we begin to root for our favorite Loud.

This is a procedure with which we are quite familiar, and it is accomplished almost by reflex. Every radio and television show, movie, and cómic strip built on the family format has required of us the same superficial discriminations. Even now, as the Louds are asserting their presence in their medium, they are in direct competition with *The Brady Bunch*, *All in the Family*, *Family Affair*, *My Three Sons*, *The Partridge Family*, and more. It may be argued that *An American Family* is real life drama, and ought not to be yoked with *The Brady Bunch*, but theoretically a semblance of reality is the aspiration of *The Brady Bunch*, and of the other shows as well. The questions of propriety raised by *An American Family* are no different in kind from those raised by the Bunker family, which has been hailed and defiled solely because of its proximity to reality.

It is far less interesting that the Louds are real than that we react to them as if they were not. Because they come to us on a regular schedule each week, the same cast, the same settings, because they engage in a new and complete adventure every episode, edited largely in the same patterns, and because our appreciation and apprehension of them increases according to the continuum of the performances, we reasonably take the Louds to be fictitious. If they were on radio, they would bring to mind *One Man's Family*. On television, they become reincarnations of Ozzie and Harriet Nelson, a notable American family of another age, whose appeal, like the Louds', derives from their being the same family off-stage and on. Like the Louds, Ozzie and Harriet had teenage children, and a nice house, and confusions and misunderstandings. Ozzie did something for a living — it was never clear what — but his family, like the Louds, never wanted. Ozzie was a good guy, just like Bill. Ricky was a rock 'n roll star, just as Grant and Kevin hope to be, just as Delilah wants to become a tap dancer.

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James Grant

The Origins of the Cold War

Rarely have so many had such good reason for humility as that growing band of historians whose specialty is the Cold War. With Soviet intentions in the immediate postwar period still unclear — the early years of the Cold War are among the most secretive in Russian history and U.S. State Department archives have only recently opened through to the end of 1946 — dogmatism can rest on no firmer foundation than political theory and bluster.

The defeat of Hitler's Germany laid waste not only the threat of Nazi aggression, but the balance of power that had earlier failed to contain it. When the United States and Great Britain faced the Soviet Union in the spring of 1945, it was across a chasm of suspicion that during the bleakest hours of the war had threatened the allied coalition with disintegration. With Hitler's fall, nothing was left — certainly little of the trust that had been the object of Roosevelt's "grand design" for postwar cooperation. In the unfamiliar daylight of victory, the Soviet Union emerged not as the allies had come to imagine her — co-defender of civilization, partner in the peace to follow — but as a Great Power, heir to both the dreams of Russian empire and the pretensions of a universal ideology.

"If it's not one damn thing, it's another." So must many a diplomat have groaned in the early days of victory. The war that began with the invasion of Poland had ended with her rape. By mid-1945, the Yalta Declaration on Eastern Europe stood revealed as a fraud. The western-oriented Polish government in London, promised representation in the Warsaw puppet regime, was effectively blocked from power. Sixteen resistance leaders whom the Soviets had invited to Moscow for discussions on "broadening" the communist government had been arrested. ("The guilty ones will be tried," Molotov reportedly assured American and British colleagues — Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67;* New York, 1968, p. 383.)

By the Potsdam Conference (July, 1945), noncommunists in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania had been barred from government's front door or ushered out by the back. In June, the Czech communist regime found itself faced with Soviet demands for cession of the Carpatho-Ukraine. Tito, firmly entrenched in Yugoslavia, had ordered his forces into Trieste and the Italian province of Venezia Biulia.

In April 1945, calls from within the Party for postwar coexistence with the West European democracies had come under the scathing and apparently official attack of French communist leader Jacques Duclos. The American State Department which a year earlier had noticed links between revolutionary activity in Latin America and Soviet embassies there, quickly interpreted the article — aimed at the policies of American Party chief Earl Browder — as Moscow's signal for a new phase of Party activism. Then in June came news of the arrest of six people, among them State Department officials, on charges of passing classified documents to the editors of *Amerasia*. The promise held out by the abolition of the Comintern (1943) and Stalin's wartime appeals to Russian nationalism seemed a pipe dream.

In the West, strategists were alarmed but not surprised. It had appeared that some Russian pressure in East Europe was inevitable, if regrettable. (So FDR had earlier characterized the prospects of Soviet hegemony over the three Baltic states assigned her in the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact.) The war had cost the Soviets millions of lives. (Later estimates put the figure at between 15 and 20 million; total Anglo-American losses were less than a million.) Suffering and destruction had been enormous. Surely Stalin's claims that this disaster must not be allowed to happen again — "(Poland) was a question of both honor and security" to the Soviet Union, Churchill remembered the Soviet dictator reminding him at Yalta — were not without merit. Were there to be no tangible rewards for the enormous Russian contribution to victory?

Western statesmen were all too aware of the burden Soviet armies had carried. Three months after the Normandy landings, Churchill could write Stalin, "I shall take occasion to repeat tomorrow in the House of Commons what I have said before, that it is the Russian army that tore the guts out of the German military machine and is at the present moment holding by far the larger proportion of the enemy on its front." General Douglas MacArthur, who could later marvel at the generosity of American concessions at Yalta, remarked to a Washington staff officer in early 1945 that Soviet support would be essential for the planned invasion of Japan.

"It is easy, after the Germans are beaten," Churchill cautioned critics yet unborn, "to condemn those who did their best to hearten the Russian military effort or to keep in harmonious contact with our great ally, who had suffered so frightfully . . .. Our hopeful assumptions were soon to be falsified, but they were the only ones possible at the time." As the war progressed, the specter of international communism and memories of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Russian invasion of Finland receded in the minds of men whose first duty was to oversee the Axis defeat.

Another source of the American preoccupation with allied harmony, which neither revelations of the Katyn Forest massacre nor the agonizing Soviet pause outside the gates of Warsaw could dampen, was a view of postwar security premised on the notion of collective security. The balance of power had been discredited by history, leading American planners believed. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had campaigned for the League in 1920 as Democratic vice-presidential candidate, told a joint session of Congress following his return from Yalta: "(The Crimean Conference) spells the end of the system of unilateral action

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and exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and balance of power and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries — and failed." Two years earlier, Secretary of State Hull had banished the original sin of nations by promising Congress: ". . . there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any of the other special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests."

The first corollary to this view — which was by no means universal among FDR's advisers — was that good will was a more potent force than power. In rejecting the advice of former Soviet ambassador William C. Bullitt for a tougher bargaining stance toward the Kremlin, Roosevelt reportedly explained: "I don't dispute your facts. They are accurate. I don't dispute your reasoning. I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of a man . . . . I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask for nothing in return, *noblesse oblige*, he won't try to annex anything and work with me in a world of democracy and peace."

It appears that Soviet truculence over Poland had led Roosevelt to second thoughts, concerning his policy of cooperation, a wariness anticipated by the decision not to share atomic secrets with Stalin. Nevertheless, the weight attached by American planners to procedural questions in the World Organization and their unwillingness to coordinate strategic planning with postwar political goals points up a reliance on Big Three cooperation which later events were to prove unrealistic.

Coupled with faith in the efficacy of collective security and guilt over the burden carried by the Red Army was the nagging uncertainty over whether the Soviets, if pressed too hard in the Baltic and Eastern Europe, might conclude a separate peace with Germany and abandon plans to enter the war against Japan. Amid western reports that an appeasement bloc had surfaced in the Soviet government, Moscow announced in July 1943 the formation of a Free Germany Committee, what seemed the nucleus of a pro-Soviet government ready to grasp power in Berlin should Hitler be overthrown. As late as October 1943, Roosevelt was sufficiently concerned about the possibilities of Soviet withdrawal to query Ambassador Stanley in Moscow: "What do you think, Bill, will he (Stalin) make a separate peace with Hitler?"

Nor was the Soviet Union the exclusive object of American suspicions. Traditional British reliance on the balance of power and Churchill's interest in Europe's "soft underbelly" betrayed to many an unseemly preoccupation with postwar political gain. It was not until May 1945 that of those Americans who recognized dissension in allied ranks, more blamed the Soviet Union than Great Britain. (American Institute of Public Opinion Poll cited in John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*; N.Y., 1972, p. 230.) In July 1945, Lord Halifax, British ambassador to the United States, reported to Churchill that despite an apparent readiness to stand up to the Russians, "(The Americans) showed some signs of nervousness in my portrayal of Europe . . . as the scene of a clash of ideas in which the Soviet and western influences are likely to be hostile and conflicting. At the back of their minds there are still lingering suspicions that we want to back Right Wing Governments or monarchies for their own sake."

The Soviets, meanwhile, were absorbed with suspicions of their own. Stalin brooded darkly over the West's delay in establishing a second front, over German reparations and the British and American refusal to permit active Soviet participation in the occupation of Italy. Fears that the United States and Great Britain would come to separate terms

with Hitler dogged Stalin throughout the war. When, in March 1945, the United States rejected a Soviet bid to participate in the surrender talks underway between U.S. and German Italian-theater commanders in Berne, Switzerland — the talks were purely tactical, U.S. officials explained — the Russians fumed. Molotov suggested pointedly that the United States had been negotiating "behind the back of the Soviet government which has been carrying on the main burden of the war against Germany." Stalin himself charged that "the negotiations . . . have ended in agreement with the Germans, on the basis of which the German commander on the Western front — Marshall Kesselring, has agreed to open the front and permit the Anglo-American troops to advance to the East, and the Anglo-Americans have promised in return to ease for the Germans the peace terms." The openness of U.S. policy itself probably became the object of Soviet suspicions. General John R. Deane, head of the American Military Mission to the Soviet Union, argued in 1944 that the Russians "simply cannot understand giving without taking, and as a result even our giving is viewed with suspicion."

Such was the nature of the Soviet system that western leaders may well have wondered what meaning the Russians attached to the words "trust" and "security." What could such terms have signified to Joseph Stalin, author of the purges and spy mania of the thirties, of the collectivization that in terms of sheer brutality rivaled the Nazi invasion itself?

Thus, small wonder that misperceptions and ill will hounded the Grand Alliance through most of its days. "Words have a different connotation to the Soviets than they have to us," Secretary Hull once observed. "When they speak of insisting on 'friendly governments' in their neighboring countries, they have in mind something quite different from what we would mean." (Robert Sherwood noted during his account of the Hopkins mission to Moscow in 1945: "there was apparently no way of translating the word 'friendly' from one language to another so that it would make sense." — Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*; N.Y., 1948, p. 908.) Negotiators faced the same problem with political concepts. The Soviets either refused or were unable to make the distinction between classical spheres of influence and the kind of domination they came to practice in Eastern Europe.

From the beginning, it must have appeared to the Soviets that the West was willing to live and let live within assigned spheres of responsibility, despite the American preoccupation with idealistic documents. Such likely was the impression Molotov carried away from negotiations with Roosevelt on the opening of a second front in Europe before the end of 1942. The talks, which ended with hedged American promises that a second front would be established, also touched on the shape of the postwar world. The Soviet Union would obviously have a major role to play, along with the other global policemen, Roosevelt assured the Soviet Foreign Minister. Then, too, long-term arrangements would have to be made for disarming the Axis powers and administering former colonial areas. " FDR suggested that Mr. Stalin might profitably consider the establishment of some form of international trusteeships over these islands and possessions," Sherwood reported Roosevelt as saying. There can be little doubt that Stalin was heartened by the American president's vision of things to come.

In the same sense, the Soviets must have applauded British willingness to talk of the postwar world in terms of regional influence. Under the provisions of a famous agreement between Churchill and Stalin in October 1944, the Soviet Union was assigned ninety percent influence in Rumania, while the British were to enjoy the same privilege in Greece. The two powers would share Yugoslavia. The Soviets proved as good as their word when the British stepped into the 1944 communist Greek insurrection. While western newspapers pilloried Churchill as a monarchist, *Pravda* and *Isvestia* remained silent.

But by March of the next year, Soviet forbearance on British policy in Greece had taken on a retrospectively ominous note. Churchill wrote that his authority to protest Soviet moves in Rumania had been undercut by the percentages arrangement concluded in Moscow: ". . . If I pressed, (Stalin) might say, 'I did not interfere with your action in Greece; why do you not give me some latitude in Rumania?' "

The Soviets could hardly have failed to notice other western signals. At the first meeting of the Yalta Conference, President Roosevelt announced in passing that the American occupation of Europe would last no more than two years. "Formidable questions rose to my mind," Churchill recalled in his *Memoirs*. "If the Americans left Europe,

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Britain would have to occupy single-handed the entire Western portion of Germany. Such a task would go far beyond our strength." Emphasis given the symbolic aspect of the Polish question by Harry Hopkins during his talks with Stalin four months later could not have impressed the Soviets with American determination to enforce the letter of treaty agreements on Eastern Europe.

Nor is it likely that American public opinion would have countenanced a sharp break with past policies at that time, even if the newly installed Truman Administration had been inclined to lead one. In light of the rejection by Truman of Churchill's suggestion that American troop movements in Europe be used as a bargaining lever against the Soviets, it is apparent that cooperation had not yet been discredited.

But by the end of 1945, both the American public and its government had succumbed to disillusionment. Fifty-four percent of those Americans polled in August 1945 had voiced a willingness to trust the Soviets to cooperate at the end of the war. Three months later, following the failure of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in London, the number had dropped to 44 percent. By February 1946, it had reached 35 percent. (American Institute of Public Opinion polls, cited by Gaddis, p. 289.)

Alarmed at continued Soviet intransigence in Manchuria, in Europe, and in Iran — as well as prospects for Republican exploitation of the new mood — President Truman came to adopt the hard line anticipated by his sharp warning to Molotov the spring before on "living up to your agreements."

By 1946, politicians of both parties were scrambling to disown the wartime policy of "appeasement." "What is Russia up to now?" Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg demanded of its architects. "We ask it in Manchuria. We ask it in Eastern Europe and the Dardanelles . . . . We ask it in Poland . . . . " Peaceful relations between East and West were possible, he said, but only "if the United States speaks as plainly upon all occasions as Russia does; . . . . if we abandon this miserable fiction, often encouraged by our own fellow-travellers, that we somehow jeopardize the peace if our candor is as firm as Russia's always is. . . . "

Of the internal pressures that might have governed Soviet policies, we can only speculate. ". . . To me the fundamental question in respect to our relations with Russia is whether we are dealing with a nation or a religion," Secretary of the Navy James F. Forrestal wrote of the dilemma that had beset American policy makers by the close of 1945. But neither a contemporary study commissioned by Forrestal nor the work of another generation of scholars has succeeded in explaining the peculiar mix of xenophobia, ideological fervor, and traditional imperialism that fashioned Soviet policies.

Yet is it within the pale of common sense to suggest that the advantages of continued world tension sorely tempted Soviet leaders as they surveyed the price of victory. Western Russia lay in ruins; production had fallen 50 percent from prewar levels. (Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence, The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67*; 1968, p. 400.) A capitalist America emerged from the war mightier than before. Cries of the imminence of western aggression had been useful since 1921 in marshalling tolerance for the sacrifices of war and labor. And if we can believe Khrushchev's claim that postwar demobilization had reduced Russia's armed forces by more than two-thirds within three years of the German defeat (cited in Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*; New York, 1968, p. 403), it would seem that Soviet fears of "atomic blackmail" were to some extent tailored for home consumption.

Positions on both sides hardened throughout 1946. On February 9, Stalin spoke on the theme of East-West incompatibility, a speech *Time* magazine labeled "the most warlike pronouncement uttered by any top-rank statesman since V-J Day." On February 28, the day after Vandenberg's Senate address, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes delivered the first public statement of the Administration's new Soviet policy, warning that the United States would frown on a slow nibbling away of the status quo. George F. Kennan's detailed analysis of the ideological underpinnings of Soviet expansion brought chills to an impressionable Washington audience. On March 5 Churchill — now a private citizen — warned his listeners at Fulton, Missouri, that "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent." Later in the month, Andrei Gromyko, the Russian representative at the United Nations, stalked out in protest of the decision to keep the Iranian question on the Security Council agenda. The Council of Foreign Ministers met through the end of the year, unable to mend growing disagreement over the reparations agreements on Germany. In August, a show of American naval power in the eastern Mediterranean apparently intimidated the Soviets into dropping demands for bases in the Dardanelles. When in March 1947, President Truman approached the Congress with an unprecedented request for aid to two nations far outside traditional American perimeters of defense, the measure passed handily.

By early 1946, the battle lines had been drawn. In retrospect, it is hard to see how things might have been different. With the fall of Naziism — the bailing wire and chewing gum of allied harmony — the two Great Powers were thrown together in a new world order. The jealousy of states, compounded by first principle and misperception, became the Cold War, a conflict more bitter for the promise that there could be no Cold War. □

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Has the Cold War a Future?

It is a widely accepted proposition that the United States and the Soviet Union have entered a new phase in their relations, and that the fierce competition and hostility of the Cold War have given way to an era of detente, cooperation, and negotiation. The evidence marshalled in support of this "new wisdom" is impressive: a series of arms control accords between the two superpowers, the apparent interest of the Soviet Union in the dampening of tension in Europe and elsewhere, and, in the Moscow Summit Conference of 1972, agreement by the United States and the Soviet Union to a Declaration of Principles calling for "peaceful coexistence" and the development of "normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual advantage."

Basic to the thesis that the Cold War has ended is the assumption that the bipolar world of U.S.-Soviet confrontation has been replaced by an international system in which Moscow and Washington find broadening areas of harmony of interest, or at least the possibility of accommodation. To be sure, the world of the 1970s differs in several important respects from the world of the 1950s or even the 1960s. In recent years, both the United States and the Soviet Union have faced disintegrative forces in their alliance systems, and the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s has been replaced by deeply-rooted animosity between Peking and Moscow. In Europe and Japan, major new centers of economic power have been built on the ruins of World War II.

Over the past decade, both the Soviet Union and the United States have acquired vast, highly advanced weapons systems of mass destruction; additional powers — Britain, France, and China — have built national nuclear capabilities and many other states now have the technological know-how to produce such weapons. In certain categories of strategic systems, (i.e., launch vehicles, throw-weight, and warhead size) the Soviet Union has achieved a *quantitative* lead over the United States, although the United States retains an advantage in numbers of warheads, deliverable megatonnage, missile accuracy, and new technology, for example in MIRV. As symbolized in the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords of 1972, the Soviet Union has achieved strategic "parity" with the United States. From its position as a clearly inferior power in the 1950s and

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1960s, the Soviet Union of the 1970s, with a rapidly expanding modern navy, casts the shadow of its influence into regions of the globe from which Soviet power was historically excluded. At the same time, the United States has entered a period of greater preoccupation with domestic affairs and intense introspection and doubt about the premises which shaped its global policies and interests during the past generation.

In this changed world of the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union *have* entered a new period in their relations. If they have found common interest in limited arms control agreements and in negotiations on other issues, Washington and Moscow continue, nevertheless, to compete for influence in Europe and Asia, as well as in the Middle East. Just as the United States seeks to strengthen its links with Peking, the Soviet Union makes a concerted effort to build new relationships with the West European allies of the United States, notably the German Federal Republic. Moreover, the Soviet Union seeks to outflank China by developing new relationships with countries of the Asian rimland, and especially India. The Soviet Union has strengthened its naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and Moscow has embarked on a diplomacy designed to enhance Soviet influence around the southern periphery of China and to seek, over time, a new relationship with Japan.

In Europe, the Soviet Union has altered its tactics rather than its overall strategy. As a result of adroit diplomacy in recent years toward the German Federal Republic, the Soviet Union has achieved one of its long-held goals: international recognition of the postwar frontiers of East-Central Europe and the international acceptance of the German Democratic Republic. The *gradual* disengagement of American military power and the neutralization or "Finlandization" of Western Europe remains a Soviet goal. Moscow seeks to avoid any abrupt change in the American relationship which might lead the Europeans to political unity or a major defense effort and the formation of a European nuclear force. The eventual neutralization of Western Europe would ease the Soviet task of communist control in East-Central Europe and strengthen Moscow in its confrontation with China over the next decade. Parenthetically, in this respect, Peking and Moscow interests in Western Europe are opposed: China favors a strong U.S. military presence and a unified Western Europe in order to divert Soviet power from the long Sino-Soviet frontier. Thus, in Western Europe the basic interests of the United States and Soviet Union remain divergent. While the Soviet Union strives to become the dominant power in Europe, the United States seeks to build a partnership with Western Europe capable of developing greater unity and providing more adequately for its own defense.

Over the next decade, American and Soviet interests are likely to continue to diverge in other parts of the globe, for example, in the Middle East. While the Egyptian expulsion of Soviet advisers and technicians in 1972 may have pointed up the limits of Soviet influence in the Arab world, Moscow retains extensive ties with other Arab states, including Iraq and Syria and even Egypt. For the Soviet Union, the importance of the Middle East will grow. Moscow and Washington will continue to seek to prevent tensions in the area from escalating to a direct confrontation between the superpowers. Yet, this may become progressively more difficult either as a result of the growing western dependence on Middle East oil or the continuation of conflict between a strengthened, modernizing Arab world, supported by the Soviet Union, and Israel, backed ultimately by the United States, fighting to retain all or some of the occupied territories acquired in the June 1967 war to achieve "secure boundaries."

Even now, the world demand for oil has enhanced the importance of the Middle East to the West, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, to the Soviet Union. As a result of rapidly rising energy needs, three of the major world power centers — the United States, Western Europe, and Japan — will become more heavily dependent on Middle East oil. Hence the importance to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, of restricting Soviet influence in the Middle East will increase.

Fundamental to the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the 1970s is the Sino-Soviet conflict. So long as this conflict persists, both Moscow and Peking will seek to prevent each other from strengthening its ties with Washington at the other's expense. This has already conferred upon the United States considerable leverage in its dealings both with the Soviet Union and China. It made possible, together with the Soviet need for U.S. wheat and technology, President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May, 1972, just after the mining of North Vietnamese waters and the intensification of bombing. Conversely, the persistence of the rift makes it possible for the United States to develop with the Soviet Union and China a less hostile relationship than either communist state can develop with the other.

It follows, then, that a major improvement in Sino-Soviet relations would threaten much of the basis for an improved U.S.-Soviet relationship, and in fact would place in jeopardy the structure of an international system based either on a triangular relationship between Moscow, Peking, and Washington or a more multipolar system including as principal actors Western Europe and Japan. The future prospects for an improvement in Soviet-American relations then depend upon the course of Sino-Soviet relations after Breshnev and Mao, both of whom can be expected to depart from the leadership scene before the end of this decade. It also depends upon the continued willingness of the Soviet Union to forego the use of force, nuclear or conventional, to destroy China's nuclear capability before it is adequate to provide a credible second strike against the Soviet Union.

In sum, only if the United States were prepared to redefine its national interests to exclude all regions beyond North America and to acquiesce in a clearly inferior strategic posture *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union (a prescription that not even some of the severest critics of U.S. globalism have advocated), the prospect for continued U.S.-Soviet competition looms large. Both sides will strive for technological breakthroughs designed to enhance the deterrent value of their strategic forces. Both, for their own reasons, will attempt to exacerbate the

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tensions within each other's alliance systems and form new relationships with allies of the other. Both will seek to preserve and extend their influence in the Middle East and in other areas of the Third World deemed vital to security. Both will continue to have different, and even divergent conceptions of "peace," differences in the principles for organizing their domestic societies, and differing conceptions of national interest underlying their respective foreign policies. If this is not the "Cold War" of the decade after World War II, it is nevertheless a far more complex form of competition whose outcome will shape the international system as well as the role of the United States in the remaining decades of this century. □

Robert H. Ferrell

Truman Foreign Policy: A Traditionalist View

This is the conclusion of an article examining the Cold War revisionists and Truman foreign policy. The first part appeared in our April issue.

3

Revisionist critics of American foreign policy during the cold war era have found three problems or issues or aspects of policy that came to decision in the year 1946 which bother them in varying degree. Like the contentions discussed in preceding pages these also are worth careful notice in what by this juncture may be beginning to appear as an effort to knock down every theory that the revisionists have put up. Frankly, and at risk of appearing to be a traditionalist, a defender of received truths and a victim of cold war rhetoric (after all, is there not *some* merit in any position?), the present writer may as well admit that he finds it difficult to believe any of their arguments. Still, the arguments are worth looking into, if only to point out places in which future scholars who will have full benefit of at least the American diplomatic archives should attempt to concentrate their researches.

The first of the concerns of the revisionists that came to decision in 1946 was an American offer to limit atomic weapons, which to the revisionists has appeared not altogether sincere. In view of the developing troubles with the Russians, why would the Americans want to give away the atomic bomb? In the months immediately after Hiroshima and Nagasaki did they not in fact try to use the atomic monopoly to persuade the Russians to be more reasonable? Could not the Baruch Plan of 1946 have been itself a ploy, for instead of making an outright effort to share the atomic secret with the Soviets the American government passed the whole issue to the United Nations and proposed an impossibly hedged program, which only affronted the Russians? These questions, one must say, are reasonable. The work of Alperovitz, unbelievable in itself, called attention to the possible use of atomic diplomacy later. Much later, in the 1950s and early 1960s, Khrushchev had been adept at scaring other nations, and had some reason to complain of similar ungentlemanly — *nikulturni* — behavior by American leaders. It was understandable that the revisionists would look back into the American atomic past and ask how the United States government had behaved during the era when it was Mr. Atomic Bomb. The revisionists are also concerned about what political scientists have described as atomic blackmail, which they properly consider indistinguishable from atomic diplomacy (everything depends on who gives and who receives; blackmail is always received).

Now it is undeniable that Secretary Byrnes, who has never proved amusing to the revisionists, told Assistant Secretary of War McCloy in August, 1945, that he intended to go to the forthcoming London Foreign Ministers Conference with the implied threat of the bomb in his pocket, and Secretary of War Stimson on September 4 recorded in his diary

a similar conversation with Byrnes: "I took up the question . . . how to handle Russia with the big bomb. I found that Byrnes was very much against any attempt to cooperate with Russia. His mind is full of his problems with the coming meeting of foreign ministers and he looks to having the presence of the bomb in his pocket, so to speak, as a great weapon to get through the thing." Stimson was accustomed to dictating into a machine some six, eight, even ten or twelve doublespaced pages of diary every morning while shaving, and the words poured forth without any large thought, and as shortly after the end of the Second World War his detailed diary would become a quarry for investigators of the Pearl Harbor disaster, so it is now becoming a place to find all sorts of things about the cold war. But while the diary accounting of the Byrnes conversation may be a little stark it probably is close to the gist of the conversation.

What the historian has to add is that once Byrnes got to London for the meeting that began in September and ran into early October, 1945, he does not seem to have threatened anyone. The closest that researchers can come to evidence of hard talking at London is some casual conversation that may not have meant anything. At a cocktail party Molotov, who according to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was drinking "rather much, even for him," raised his glass and said: "Here's to the Atom Bomb," and added, "We've got it." As is now known, this was an exaggeration. Bevin admittedly had become nervous because during one conference session Molotov had proposed that if Britain would not agree to allot a former Italian colony in Africa to Russia, the USSR would be content to have the Belgian Congo. Did that, Bevin wondered, mean that the Russians wanted uranium?[42] Meanwhile, on the third day of the conference, Byrnes and Molotov had indulged in some kidding which took a form that might have been diplomatic but, as most Americans would admit upon reading what Byrnes said, probably was just kidding. Molotov in his peculiar way — the Russian possessed a sardonic sense of humor, and liked the droll and sometimes the slightly macabre — asked Byrnes, rather out of the blue, if the Secretary had an atomic bomb in his side pocket. "You don't know Southerners," was Jimmy's response. "We carry our artillery in our hip pocket. If you don't cut out all this stalling and let us get down to work, I am going to pull an atomic bomb out of my hip pocket and let you have it." Whereupon Molotov laughed, as did the interpreter. Four nights later Byrnes was making a lyrical speech about harmony and cooperation, perhaps a bit on the Irish side, and Molotov paid him a tribute by saying that he really was gifted and, in addition, Byrnes had an atomic bomb.[43]

If the above badinage, not in the best of taste considering that it occurred only a few weeks after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, amounted to atomic diplomacy it was deft to the point of being difficult to recognize. And it is necessary to add that while Byrnes was in London the Truman Administration, contrary to his desire, was considering a proposal by Stimson to open conversations with the

42. Diary of Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton, quoted in Herbert Feis, **From Trust to Terror**, p. 98.

43. Book-length manuscript on the origins of the cold war by Lisle Rose, to be published in 1973 by Charles Scribner's Sons; I am indebted to Rose and his publisher for access to the manuscript.

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Russians on atomic matters, with prior approval by the British, before taking a plan for control of atomic energy to the United Nations. In an often misunderstood letter accompanying his proposition, as the then Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, explained years later in *Present at the Creation*, the Secretary of War had spoken loosely of "sharing the atomic bomb with Russia," but that was not really the issue. Still, talk of "sharing" got into the newspapers, and there was more interest at least in a cooperative approach to the Russians on international limitation of atomic energy than the Secretary of State thought desirable.

What bothers the revisionists about the issue of atomic diplomacy is that within a month Truman changed his mind about conferring initially with the Russians on atomic matters and began to talk about going directly to the United Nations. What happened, according to Acheson, was that the cabinet talk had been preceded by very little thought or preparation, and the press leak about the discussion threw Congress into an uproar and brought a proposal from Prime Minister Clement Attlee for a joint British-Canadian-American conference. The President came to see that he would have an enormously difficult time getting congressional and popular and perhaps even London-Ottawa approval for any sort of atomic pourparlers with the Russians.[44]

The revisionists believe that the wartime effort to keep a secret from the Russians was itself almost enough to ensure the postwar breakup of the grand alliance, and that only an immediate postwar offer to discuss the problem *a deux* could have atoned for it, whatever the domestic political results, and that when in addition to the wartime mistake and the immediate postwar refusal to discuss problems of limitation with the Soviets there followed an American plan, the Baruch Plan, which was so full of American safeguards that it was impossible for the Russians to accept, the entire chapter of policy was impossible to view with any other feeling than that, as the Russians put it, the Americans were scheming to maintain their atomic monopoly.

Still, it is difficult to conclude that the Truman Administration did its worst in regard to limitation of atomic weapons. The effort to limit atomic weapons was an unprecedented proposition. The Administration had to pay attention to a very sensitive Congress and public. By defying American desires in Eastern Europe the Russians were not exactly helping their own case. When at last the Truman Administration in June, 1946, went to the United Nations with the Baruch Plan the latter was no effort to dump the issue into the hands of an international body that could do nothing; the UN was not a dispose-all for American negotiators who wanted to keep the bomb. The choice of Baruch as the chief American negotiator may have been unwise, but the time put into the business of drawing up the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and then the Baruch Plan was so large as to suggest a serious American effort. If it failed, the failure is no proof that the Administration planned it that way — so as to be able to continue to threaten the Soviets with atomic bombs. There is evidence that the President himself had little faith in the bomb as a diplomatic or even military weapon. In the autumn of 1945 he was talking with Budget Director Harold D. Smith and, according to Smith, commented that "There are some people in the world who do not seem to understand anything except the number of divisions you have." "Mr. President," said Smith, "you have an atomic bomb up your sleeve." "Yes," was the reply, "but I am not sure it can ever be used."[45]

In seeking to find some way of dealing with the Russians the Administration, according to the revisionists, tried economic pressure, and botched the job. Could this have been so? One really must raise several doubts, and there is no proof on the other side. It is possible that, as Schlesinger has related, the Russians misinterpreted the abrupt cancellation of lend lease on May 12, 1945, as blackmail, the American handling of the USSR's request for a large postwar loan as deliberate sabotage, and the ending of reparations from the western zones of Germany as pro-Germanism. But then perhaps if the Americans had done everything the Russians wanted on economic issues it would have changed nothing. According to Schlesinger, it "is not clear . . . that satisfying Moscow on any of these financial scores would have made much essential difference."[46] Moreover, with exception of one admitted internal administrative confusion it is hard to see what alternative the Americans had, other than what in fact they did do.

Such revisionists as Alperovitz, Williams, and Gardner have interpreted the sudden cutting off of lend lease on May 12, 1945, as a sign of crude pressure by the Truman Administration, but a recent article by George C. Herring based on the Stettinius papers at the University of Virginia and unpublished State Department and other records proves that there was nothing but an administrative failure — the decision to cut off lend lease was an overly legal decision taken by a few subordinate officials, it applied to all countries and not merely Russia, it was violently opposed by Harriman and Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton and Stettinius, and new orders allowed ships at sea to turn around again and head for their foreign ports. The Herring article shows what a privileged position Russian lend lease enjoyed, how the Soviet-American "protocols" or treaties were never the detailed, binding instruments the United States demanded and obtained from the other allies, and that the Soviets anyway were asking, by May, for many items that were not really usable in the war against Japan.[47] The episode bothered American leaders, sensitive to Russian sensitivity, and Truman's memoirs relate that Stalin at Potsdam was full of talk about the cutting off of lend lease, although the Potsdam records do not so indicate.

If the American handling of lend lease in May, 1945, was no attempt at economic pressure, and perhaps the revisionists now would admit as much, there remains the business of the Russian loan and of American treatment of German reparations. Molotov in January, 1945, had mentioned a large postwar credit, $6,000,000,000, and said the Soviets would be willing to use the money to buy American goods because this would help prevent a postwar depression in the United States. Roosevelt asked that nothing be done until he could talk to Stalin. The latter said nothing about a loan during the Yalta Conference, nor did the dictator mention the loan proposal during the talks with Hopkins in Moscow in May, 1945, nor during the Potsdam Conference. Why didn't Stalin, so fond of remarking the enormous damage the Germans had wreaked upon Russia, and the unhurt nature of the American economy, then ask the Americans for a loan? Was he too shy?[48]

Not until early 1946 was anything done about a loan, at which point the proposal of Molotov for $6,000,000,000 was cut to $2,000,000,000 and conditions put on it which the Russians refused. They wanted a no-strings loan, which made no sense to Americans at the time. A report within the US government estimated that the Soviet economy could recover without American aid, that the Russians could regain their prewar level of capital investment by 1948, and that a loan of $2,000,000,000 would only speed up reconstruction by three to four months.[49] It is quite true that during the war the Soviets had fought two-thirds of the German army, that Russian deaths had reached from fifteen to twenty million, compared to perhaps one million for the western allies, that the output of Russian industry was halved by the German invasion and transfer of factories to the east. The conclusion is almost inescapable that the Soviets despite their enormous losses and needs did not want the loan, except under impossibly lenient conditions.

As for whether a freely granted loan — what good Methodists sometimes refer to as a free-will offering — might have influenced the Soviets, the revisionist expert on the loan question, Thomas G. Paterson, can come to no more of a con-

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44. **Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department** (New York, 1969), pp. 123-124.
45. Quoted in the Rose manuscript.
46. "Origins of the Cold War," p. 45.
47. "Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1945," **Journal of American History**, vol. 56 (1969-1970), 93-114.
48. Soviet unwillingness in 1945 to follow up the Molotov proposal produced an impossible situation for the Americans. Should the United States have taken the initiative?
49. Thomas G. Paterson, "The Abortive American Loan to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1943-1946," **Journal of American History**, vol. 56 (1969-1970), 77.

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clusion than the following: "The evidence suggests *(sic)* that America's refusal to aid Russia through a loan similar to that granted to the British in early 1946, perhaps *(sic)* contributed *(sic)* to a continuation of a low standard of living for the Russian people with detrimental international effects *(sic)*, to a less conciliatory and harsher Russian policy toward Germany and Eastern Europe, and to unsettled and inimical postwar Soviet-American relations." [50]

The revisionists also have cited the failure of the western allies to live up to the reparations agreements at Yalta and Potsdam as evidence of callousness toward Russian wartime suffering and postwar needs. Here one has to remark that the accords were remarkably loose, the figure of $20,000,000,000 in German reparations with half to go to Russia being only tentative. When in subsequent months the British discovered that their large dollar loan of 1946 was going in fair part to feed, as Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton put it, "these bloody Germans," when the Americans discovered that the Germans in the US occupation zone were likewise on the American taxpayer's back — when it became evident in 1946 that JCS 1067 would insure that the Germans and maybe the rest of the Continent would be on welfare for years, nothing remained but to halt reparations. [51]

The Baruch Plan, the failure of the United States to improve relations with the USSR through economic means — a third concern of the revisionists in reexamining American diplomacy in 1946 has seemed to be that the Truman Administration suddenly found itself in the midst of public assertions by Churchill and Stalin early in the year (in February and March 1946, La Feber writes, "Stalin and Churchill issued the appropriate declarations of Cold War") [52] and in a spirit of simultaneous cooperation raised up a crisis over Russian presence in Iran, taking the issue to the United Nations and forcing the Russians out. Early in 1946, well before Baruch made his speech to the UN General Assembly, and before the Soviet loan proposal and reparations had reached their dead ends, everything began to harden into what the revisionists like to describe as cold war rhetoric. Stalin on February 9 spoke of the antagonisms of communism and modern monopoly capitalism, George F. Kennan's 8,000-word cable from Moscow arrived in the State Department analyzing the historic and ideological and psychological roots of Russian intransigence, Churchill in March spoke at Fulton, Missouri, and Stalin riposted with a newspaper interview comparing Churchill and Hitler. It was in March that the United States government expelled the Russians from northern Iran, in which locality the Russians among other things had been trying to get an oil concession and also were encouraging Azerbaijani separatism.

The oratorical aspect of the first weeks of 1946 is undeniable. Although largely a Russian-British argument, with the Soviets attacking the Americans' British ally in the person of it former leader, the contentions on both sides were surely for the benefit of the United States. The oil aspect of the Iranian crisis is difficult to measure, may not have been serious, and in any event was secondary. Russian encouragement of Azerbaijani separatism followed a pattern in Eastern Europe where the Red Army had dominated politics in the areas it occupied. The Soviets certainly had overstayed their leave in Iran; by agreement with the Americans and British they had committed themselves to depart by March 2, 1946. What prompted the Russians to get out is still unclear. Whether the Americans were giving in to Churchill's anticommunism seems doubtful, and has not been proved. Adam Ulam

recently advanced the piquant theory that the Russians scampered out of Iran because Churchill had just accused them of imperialism and they did not want to provide an obvious proof of his accusation. [53] There is some indication that the Iranian premier of the moment was a wily old operator and held a diplomatic card or two under the table for dickering with the Soviets when his American partner was not looking. Truman in a press conference in 1952 told of a presidential ultimatum to the Russians, and repeated this account in his memoirs, also in a book entitled *Truman Speaks* published in 1960, and in a conversation with Herbert Druks in 1962. A recently issued volume of *Foreign Relations* contains an editorial note to the effect that records in the State Department and in the Department of Defense contain absolutely no sign of an ultimatum, and that several former high officers of State who were queried about this issue had no memory of an ultimatum. [54] The State Department's records are now open to researchers, who can check the Department's veracity on this interesting point, and perhaps uncover some real skulduggery in regard to the Iranian crisis, maybe some Anglo-American cooperation concerning the Churchillian half of "the appropriate declarations of Cold War."

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In the year 1947, which Theodore H. White in *Fire in the Ashes* has described as the Year of Divergence, American foreign policy took an avowed turn against Soviet foreign policy that could either be accounted the beginning of the cold war or, as *The New York Times* put the situation in terms of US foreign relations since 1775, the end of an epoch of isolation and occasional intervention and the beginning of an epoch of American responsibility. [55] So historic a situation has not escaped the cold war revisionists, and they have labored mightily to show how the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the decision to give the Western Germans independence were not the great signal chapters marking the beginning of a new epoch of American responsibility but only more evidences of the Truman Administration's depravity and stupidity. No anticommunistic horn of Roland sounds forth from revisionist books to echo through the valleys and across the mountains of civilization. None of that nonsense for them. Readers of their books and articles will have no feeling at all for the alarm, the confusion, the sinking hopes of individuals, leaders and publics alike, in Washington and in Western Europe, when the rigorous winter of 1946-1947 almost brought Europe's economies to a standstill and when the early springtime gave every evidence of what the military analyst for *The New York Times*, Hanson W. Baldwin, (who to the revisionists is an impossible old hawk), reported as a crisis akin to the fall of the Roman Empire. The revisionists hear only a few tumbles backstage as they quietly analyze the scene in Washington and Western Europe that spring of 1947, and though they concede some nobility to the Marshall Plan they on balance find American policy of that time to have been no great, successful rescue operation but a deplorable, uncalled-for movement into cold war confrontation.

The Truman Doctrine, they say, was first of all unnecessary because the Administration misread the situation in Greece. The truth was, they aver, and in this single observation they are probably correct, that the Greek guerrillas were not receiving help from Stalin, that the dictator later told Milovan Djilas that the guerrillas were not getting support, that instead they were receiving it from Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia, and that it was only a year or so after the American intervention in the Greek civil war that Tito for his own good reason, his split with the Russians, closed his country's border with Greece and began

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50. Ibid., pp. 70-71.
51. Dalton diary quoted in **George C. Marshall**, p. 117.
52. **America, Russia, and the Cold War**, p. 30.
53. **The Rivals**, p. 119.
54. **Foreign Relations of the United States: 1946**, VII (Washington, 1969), 348-349.
55. "The epoch of isolation and occasional intervention is ended. It is being replaced by an epoch of American responsibility." **The New York Times**, March 12, 1947.

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to force an end to the civil war, after which the Greek Stalinists gained control of the guerrillas, went over from guerrilla to set-piece battles with the revived Greek army, and lost, giving up the fight in October, 1949. The revisionists, leaning heavily on a thirty-five-page account by Barnet, relate that at no time during the American decision to create the Truman Doctrine did the Department of State try to analyze the guerrilla situation in Greece to see if intervention really was necessary.[56]

To take the latter point first, until 1972 the revisionists did not know what the Department of State knew in 1947, because the American documents had not yet been published in *Foreign Relations*. Offhand it did seem unlikely that so large and smart an outfit as the State Department would have failed to do its homework on the guerrilla problem, although the Department could not have read about Stalin's conversation with Djilas which took place in 1948 and was not published until 1962.

As for the allegiance of the Greek communists, there seems little reason to dispute Barnet's analysis except its conclusions. After all, was the factionalism of the Greek communists — their willingness to defy Stalin and take aid from Tito — very important? Three arguments say it was not. First, no one in 1947 anticipated Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948; whatever Stalin's desires in regard to the guerrillas' behavior, the Department of State had to proceed on the assumption that if (which it did not know, anyway) Stalin could not get to the guerrillas then he could get to Tito who could do the job. Second, it is an interesting and pertinent fact that after Tito's expulsion the Greek communists split on tactics, and the Stalinist faction got control; which says that whatever the faction on top in earlier years one could hardly have depended on its staying on top. The third point is that if it had not been for the outbreak of the Korean War, Stalin might have wiped out Tito, in which case where would have been the Titoist, national Greek communists? The whole business of the Greek guerrillas, to whom (Greece, Tito, or Stalin) they momentarily owed allegiance, strikes one as too volatile a situation for any prudent statesman at the time to have relied on.

The revisionists have aptly pointed out, maybe with some exaggeration, the undemocratic nature of the regime in Athens, a fact that was well known in Washington in 1947. They have enjoyed showing how the regime in Ankara also did not exactly represent the apotheosis of democracy, likewise a commonplace of the time. The Greek and Turkish foreign situations were different, in that the Russians were not employing guerrillas but putting direct diplomatic pressure on Turkey to get concessions along the Straits and on the Turkish-Soviet border, forcing the Turks to maintain an army that the impoverished country could not afford. There was indeed a threat to Turkey, but the United States government in 1945 and 1946 had said little about it publicly. As with many other conflicts with the Soviets, the United States hoped it could be quietly resolved. Some people at the time, however, thought that the Administration had gratuitously included Turkey in the Truman Doctrine. Gardner, who has an unerring eye for a good quotation, has noted the remark of a witness at one of the congressional hearings in 1947 that when "the new dish was being prepared for American consumption, Turkey was slipped into the oven with Greece because that seemed to be the surest way to cook a tough bird." The revisionists have also repeated with approval the judgment of Byrnes' *Speaking Frankly*, that "We did not have to decide that the Turkish Government and the Greek monarchy were outstanding examples of free and democratic governments."[57]

But what has bothered the cold war critics more than anything else about the Truman Doctrine is that they see it as an appalling piece of cold war rhetoric. They believe that it gave an enormous push to the anticommunism of American public opinion, and that it eventually turned upon its authors when Senator Joseph R. McCarthy accused the Truman Administration of being itself soft on communism; they believe also that the rhetoric (they are fond of the word) lasted into the 1950s with bad results, for the Secretary of State for most of that decade believed in anticommunism as fervently as he did in presbyterianism; and then in the 1960s the rhetoric took us into Vietnam.

This is a remarkable accusation, and it has been ventilated not merely in the random assertions of revisionists books and articles but in two recent volumes devoted to the point, one of which, by Richard M. Freeland, suggested to its *New York Times* reviewer, Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, the simile of an airplane ride, whereby foreign policy looks different from the air (where Freeland is, with his documents, quotations, and theories) than from the ground (where Lehmann-Haupt himself could remember the occasions and purposes of 1947).[58] It should be impossible to believe that Harry S. Truman was the inventor or, if not that, the chief distributor of anticommunism, although it is true that anyone can believe anything he wants, like the White Queen in *Alice in Wonderland* who made it her business to believe three impossible things every morning before breakfast. Ronald Steel believes that Dean Acheson was the real villain in the anticommunization of his fellow citizens; Acheson knew what might happen, but to get the Administration's measures through Congress and to win the approbation of the public he willingly gave the American people injections of anticommunism.[59] The allegation is so large that it is difficult to put down. Suffice to say that it shows more faith in the efficacy of a single speech than one ordinarily would expect. Moreover, if Acheson, as Steel says, showed a contempt for the American people by giving all those anticommunism shots, could one not turn this commentary around and say that the revisionists themselves show a contempt for the American people, to think that the public was so gullible that a little campaign from official Washington could have manipulated their minds? Arthur Vandenberg is alleged to have said to Truman, a few days before the President gave the Truman Doctrine address of March 12, that it was necessary to scare hell out of the country. Memories of the Vandenberg remark differ, and he may not have said just that. The address was not all that scary, though the Administration sought to put the Greek-Turkish issue into the large framework it deserved. Years later, George Kennan remarked his personal sadness that the Truman Doctrine had become a world-wide program — though it is not clear that it ever did, even under John Foster Dulles, not to mention Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon. It is certain that the Truman Administration had no such intention before the speech, nor did it behave that way afterward. If in subsequent months and years there was a lot of talk about anticommunism, the talk had something to do with such non-Truman occurrences as the collapse of China, the invasion of Korea, Whittaker Chambers' production of the pumpkin papers, the confession of Klaus Fuchs, Senator McCarthy's rare gifts for invention and invective. As another *New York Times* reviewer, William V. Shannon, has put it, "Truman was more often the victim than the progenitor of that time of troubles."[60]

As the revisionists have nitpicked the Truman Doctrine, they have likewise attempted to do a job on the Marshall Plan, and they say that it divided Europe, as Marshall expected it to do; and that even in its largess it was an American policy instead of an international policy; and in sum it was not a good policy. Once more they fail to show the enormous need for a program, the hectic pressure of events, the unattractive prospect of aiding Russia when the Soviets were opposing American policy in Europe, and tney do not stress the program's economic success. The cold war critics have averred, as mentioned, that the invitation Marshall extended to the Soviets was meant to be a ploy, and Charles E. Bohlen in recent lectures has confessed that both he and Kennan gave Marshall this advice. It does not follow, as the University of Connecticut critic, Paterson, has written, that "In short, the Marshall Plan was a weapon against Russia rather than

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56. **Intervention and Revolution**, pp. 97-131.
57. **Architects of Illusion**, p. 224; **Speaking Frankly** (New York, 1947), p. 302.
58. Athan G. Theoharis, **Seeds of Repression**; Richard M. Freeland, **The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948** (New York, 1971). Reviewed in **The New York Times**, Jan. 21, 1972.
59. **Imperialists and Other Heroes**, p. 23. Steel entitles his chapter on Acheson, a reprinted review of **Present at the Creation**, "Commissar of the Cold War."
60. **New York Times**, Jan. 16, 1972.

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a magnanimous, no-strings-attached undertaking to relieve destitute Europeans."[61] As for Paterson's objection to unilateral American announcement of the Marshall Plan in 1947, or if not announcement then management of the aid program only by the US government and participating nations, the possibility in other words that the Marshall Plan could have been handled by an international organization unconnected with cold war rhetoric, such as the Economic Commission for Europe, it carries a surface plausibility today when so many individuals have so little comprehension of the problems of 1947 — the weakness of international organs, the need to prevent the turning of US funds against their donor, the need to prevent funds going down the drain (with or without Russian connivance), the unwillingness of Congress and the public to give money without strings, the fact that no banker in his right mind will lend (it was of course a gift, but the analogy holds) money on a house he has not seen and without a financial statement.[62]

A third allegation against the Truman Administration's policies in 1947 deserves little discussion in detail, namely, that the officials of 1945-1949 helped bring on the cold war by dividing Germany, which thereby created the postwar result the Russians most feared, a rich, strong, rearmed, if somewhat fragmented German nation. The result is beyond question, but no good historian should work back from the result to the cause unless he wants to go all the way, which the revisionists do not, for that would mess up their usable past. The prime responsibility for the present state of affairs in Germany, as Klaus Epstein wrote some years ago, must rest with the late Adolf Hitler.[63] An award for the Division of Germany, Second Class, must go to the Russians, who in their German policy found themselves with a serious problem at the end of the Second World War. The Germans because of a long anti-Russian heritage, anticommunism, the appalling behavior of the occupying Red Army, the expulsion of twelve million East Germans, and impossible reparations — the Germans hated the Russians. It was clear that in any fair election East Germany would vote for the West. Russian offers to unify Germany, as Epstein has contended, could have been nothing other than propaganda, for the Soviets would not have gained control of the other zones and would have lost their own. But over the years the Russians produced a mighty propaganda about their desire to unify Germany, and many people have begun to believe it, and in this manner the West divided Germany. Gradually on the American side the economic and military reasons for unifying the western zones began to become apparent, and Bizonia was created on January 1, 1947, and everything followed therefrom, albeit with skillful Russian assistance (the murder of Jan Masaryk ensured passage of the Marshall Plan and the plan included participation by West Germany; the Berlin blockade ensured the carrying out of the London Recommendations of June, 1948, for a West German government; the Korean War galvanized the US government into incorporating West Germany into NATO).

On two occasions, early in 1947 and then much later, in 1952, the Soviets gave some sign of willingness to unify Germany. In 1952 they said they would allow "elections" in East Germany so long as there was neutralization. The West turned down these opportunities because, as Acheson described the offer of 1952, the timing was so suspicious that it looked like a golden apple of discord tossed over the iron curtain. The revisionists think the United States should have taken a bite out of these apples, and their opponents will agree with Acheson.

Gardner, looking for some earlier evidence of American stupidity in Germany, claims that the creation of Bizonia occurred in part because General Clay was worried stiff about socialism. Gimbel says this theory is a big piece of imagination.[64]

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In conclusion, what is there to be said about cold war revisionists and revisionism? To begin with, it is of course certain that the revisionists have not reached the end of their investigations. They are turning to issues and problems of the Truman Administration in the Far East, and Stephen Ambrose already feels sure that in the spring of 1950 the Administration was in a peculiar crisis. The National Security Council had produced NSC 68, a document that still is classified "Secret," even if more people seem to have seen it and written about it than is easily comprehensible. This document, the first full survey of national security, had asked for a tripling of the national defense budget or close to that. Meanwhile the United States was awaiting the loss of Formosa to the Red Chinese. Syngman Rhee, the American satrap in Seoul, was in trouble with his Assembly, the members of which wanted to consider unification with the North, facing Rhee with the total loss of his position. Early in June the North Koreans pro-

(continued on page 31)

61. **Cold War Critics**, p. 132.

62. Paterson suggested use of ECE in his "The Quest for Peace and Prosperity: International Trade, Communism, and the Marshall Plan," an essay in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., **Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration** (Chicago, 1970), p. 100.

63. "The German Problem, 1945-1950," **World Politics**, vol. 20 (1967-1968), 279-300. See also 92d Cong., 1st sess., Com. on Foreign Relations, **Documents on Germany: 1944-1970** (Washington, 1971), and for the 1952 proposal especially pp. 195ff.

64. Lloyd C. Gardner, "America and the German 'Problem,' 1945-1949," in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., **Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration**, pp. 113-148; John Gimbel, "Cold War: German Front." Clay was of course concerned about communism born of desperation. As for any fear for the virus of socialism, an ideological concern, that surely is a dubious point.



Making It in the Ninety-third Congress

(WASHINGTON)—Perhaps nothing is more interesting than the tale of a maiden's moral decline except of course for the chronicle of a freshman legislator's early days in Washington.

The major concern for most new members is the committee assignment. It is through the committee that a member ultimately hopes to gain his prominence, and it is on the committee that a member moves up the ladder of seniority. Each freshman makes the strongest case possible for his need to be on a particular committee, and the claim is invariably made that a certain committee is essential for re-election — though Charles S. Bullock's recent study published in the *American Political Science Review* showed no direct correlation between committee assignments and re-election in marginal districts. (Needless to say, Bullock's study could not correlate the more intangible relationships between committee assignments and re-election; e.g., campaign contributions.)

House Committee Selection Procedures

The fifteen Democrats on the powerful House Ways and Means Committee serve as an executive committee, responsible for the Democratic committee assignments; the House Speaker, Majority Leader, and Caucus Chairman also serve on what is essentially a 'committee on committees.'

Within the Republican House Committee on Committees, representing forty-four states with forty-five members,

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is the Executive Committee which is responsible for making the Republican committee assignments. The Executive Committee is composed of states which have seven or more Republican congressmen; five members are elected at-large; and there is a representative of the Ninety-second Club (freshmen members of the Ninety-second Congress), as well as one from the Ninety-third Club, each being elected by his class. The Executive Committee's vote is weighted so that, for example, Del Clawson of California (the state with the largest Republican representation) has twenty votes, whereas David Treen of Louisiana, the representative of the Ninety-third Club, has only one vote. (Both Democrats and Republicans have been very reluctant to disclose the internal mechanisms and voting procedures in the committee assignment process. But an article in the February 10, 1973 issue of the *Congressional Quarterly* apparently used "leaked" information to provide a detailed analysis on the subject.)

The Democrats and Republicans consider several factors in determining committee assignments. Successors from the same party usually receive the assignment of their predecessor, if they desire it, if they gain his support, and if they gain the support of their regional spokesman on the committee which makes the assignments. In addition, both parties like to have a regional balance, as well as an ideological balance, on the House and Senate committees.

The "Big Three" committees are Ways and Means, Rules, and Appropriations, but very few freshmen are elected to these three committees. Thereafter, committee importance usually depends upon the freshman member's personal preference. Convervatives have usually been eager to receive appointment to the House Committee on Armed Services in the past. But liberals are showing increasing interest in this committee as well. (California Democrat Ron Dellums stands out as the *faux pas* of the Armed Services Committee in the Ninety-third Congress.) In contrast, it has become increasingly difficult to have conservatives accept assignments on the House Committee on Education and Labor, a committee which has been a breeding ground for liberal policy in recent years.

Staff Hiring

A crucial concern for the elected congressman is the matter of hiring a staff. With the election of a new Congress every two years legions of job seekers descend upon the nation's capitol in search of those elusive positions with the newly elected members of Congress. Although the turnover for these elected officials is not high (93 percent of those who seek re-election are successful), the supply for congressional staff appointments is great, and it always exceeds demand. (There are exceptions; in the past it has always been more difficult for conservative members to find conservative staffers, whereas liberal staffers — as one conservative put it — are "a dime a dozen.")

A Bachelors degree in political science (or anything else for that matter) normally just does not cut the grain and very few incoming members use the placement services of the Congressional Campaign Committees, or the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, for filling their staff needs. Because incoming members are literally inundated with job applications (some freshmen from the Ninety-third Class received as many as six hundred applications, and a congressional staff can have no more than fifteen people), they usually have to rely on knowledgeable Capitol Hill acquaintances to help them fill their staffs.

The Ninety-third Congress elected twenty-six new Democrats and forty-two new Republicans, with a net gain of fourteen for the GOP. As a result, not too many jobs were available. Nonetheless, it was widely reported that 10,000 job applicants competed for the congressional staff appointments, ranging from clerical and secretarial, to those of a legislative and administrative nature.

But the glamor of the job invariably pales under general office routine. The faceless, mindless bureaucrat who be-

comes a part of the Capitol Hill infrastructure readily adjusts to this reality and during the course of a career moves from office to office (and often from party to party). The only concern of these bureaucrats is, presumably, the nine-to-five job which one day is supposed to culminate in a rewarding government pension plan. (One "hardcore" conservative was absolutely amazed by the number of applications he had for high level jobs from employees of such notable liberals as Ms. Chisholm and Mr. Fulbright.)

Somewhat ironically, congressional staffers compose one of the few groups in our society who, in the words of House Ways and Means Committee Chairman, Wilbur Mills, are denied the "opportunity" to participate in the Social Security Program. Chairman Mills intends, however, to remedy this "blatant discrimination" in the Ninety-third Congress.

Although few congressional staffers have had the notoriety, power, and influence of Bobby Baker, they remain, nonetheless, a crucial element. A staff can literally make or break the congressman, especially if the Administrative or Legislative Assistant becomes the congressman's alter-ego. So it is not surprising, given the past sparcity in conservative staffers, that the contagious Potomac Fever has overwhelmed many a conservative. Socialization in the nation's capitol often moves many a conservative legislator to the left of that philosophy which elected him.

Changes may be coming. On the Democratic side, Representative Joe Waggoner of Louisiana (the Democrat whom the White House treats better than any Republican) is attempting to organize a group of like-minded congressmen to counter the direction the Democratic party has taken under the Democratic Study Group. The Republican freshman class has also among its membership some "hardcore" conservatives who with the help of the old-line New Guarders (notably Phil Crane of Illinois and John Ashbrook of Ohio) are attempting to set up their own talent pool operation. It remains to be seen whether or not such groups can ever get off the ground; much will, therefore, probably depend on the outcome of the elections two years from now.

Congressional Reform

The would-be congressional reform movement is always strongest at the beginning of any session of Congress and the Seniority Rule is invariably the number one target. But although some rather substantial modifications have been introduced within the last two years (by House Republicans two years ago and by House Democrats and Senate Republicans in this session) the Seniority Rule remains essentially intact. In the Ninety-third Congress, House Committees (but not Senate Committees) will be closed only when the "national security" is at stake; a marked improvement over the earlier rule which left this question to the political whim of the committees.

Also a new electronic voting system has been installed which is supposed to be further evidence of Congress' modernization. But on the first day that the system was really needed — a number of major issues finally had reached the House floor — the electronic system expired and the House returned to the traditional roll call procedure. Knowledgeable Capitol Hill sources are convinced that this breakdown was no accident, for on the day it occurred the House was to vote on the question of minority staffing. Supported by Ralph Nader and Common Cause, House Republicans were hoping to gain a one-third staffing on House committees — a plan that had been submitted by House Democrats when they feared that they were about to lose control of the House. Before the vote was taken Republicans had expected the new plan to pass by three votes. The convenient breakdown of the electronic system gave the Democrats time enough to put pressure on fellow Democrats to oppose the original Democratic plan. As a result, the measure lost 197 to 196.

One of the Congress' longest traditions is the publication of the *Congressional Record*, the Hill's very own shilling thriller. The *Congressional Record*, a daily publication recording congressional proceedings when the House and Senate

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are in session, covers everything from the action on the floor of the House to the various extraneous material inserted by the congressional members; all at an approximate cost of $150 a page to the American taxpayer. *Congressional Record* is essential reading for the serious student of congressional activities, but its cost is preposterous!

Nonetheless, when the GOP's last glamor boy, Don Riegle, announced he was switching to the Democratic party, Washington's premier muckraker (columnist Jack Anderson) offered a scene-by-scene account of how Gerald Ford vainly tried to dissuade Riegle from making the switch. His account did not even closely match the coverage given by the *Congressional Record*.

With all the gusto and elegance of a Churchill, Democratic Congressman Waye Hays (Ohio) made his plea to Riegle:

"Mr. Speaker, I want to implore the Republican side of the House — I do not see the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Riegle) — on the floor — however, I want to implore the Republican side of the House to try to dissuade him from switching parties. We in the majority have treated you fellows pretty nice since I have been here, so I do not see why you would want to inflict him upon us. You know, after all is said and done, we have enough troubles of our own, and I do not think you ought to send any of your troubles over on our side.

"We had a couple of switches around here a few years ago, one notably from South Carolina, and somebody said at that time the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away, blessed be the name of the Lord.

"Well, this time I just hope, since the Lord has given him to you, that He keeps him over there and you do all you can to keep him there, too."

One Republican backbencher, who remained untouched by Mr. Hays' plea, reverently responded:

"In his infinite wisdom the Lord doth indeed giveth and taketh away. Blessed be his name."

Amen! □

Book Review

Nine Lies About America

by Arnold Beichman
Foreword by Tom Wolfe
The Library Press, $7.95

Nine Lies About America is an apologia for America and a polemic against disordered thinking, and one which succeeds in its purposes. Polemics today, unfortunately, are passe. Among respectable folk they are considered dated, unnecessarily querulous, a bit tedious, dogmatic, and distasteful. They fly in the face of the progressive view that your view is as good as my view is as good as his view is as good as, etc. In addition they employ an honest, forthright, even blunt style which is out of place in an age of euphemisms (*delinquent* youths instead of criminal, *less developed* countries instead of primitive or backward, etc.) In Christian theology polemics were used to combat heresy, which perhaps accounts for the reason they are generally linked to nonprogressive causes and to principles long since out of vogue. Of course one must carefully distinguish polemics from genuine social criticism, i.e., *MacBird* and such New Left fare as "hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today," "off the pigs," etc. In any event, it is a pleasure to see lies branded as lies and inanities clearly identified.

The fact that Arnold Beichman felt compelled to write this book is a sad commentary on the quality of much of what passes for contemporary intellectual life. Are there really "educated" people who believe that "America is a Fascist Country"? Or that "America Means Genocide" and that "The American People Are Guilty"? Surely Beichman is wasting his talents answering such absurd charges — an exercise in straw-man shooting and dead horse beating, you say. Alas, it should be so, but ain't. Beichman has summoned an array of "distinguished" educators, journalists, novelists, dramatists, and literary critics, each of whom concocts more outrageous and asinine slanders against America than the last.

Now these are not the usual inanities from the Gloria Steinem-Jane Fonda-Jerry Rubin set; they, after all, are doltish clowns from whom such fare is *de rigueur*. What is truly disturbing is Beichman's selection from such as Robert Heilbroner, Simone de Beauvoir, Arthur Waskow, James Wechsler, Ashley Montagu, Louis Kampf, Andrew Hacker, Robert Paul Wolff, Philip Slater, Eliot Fremont-Smith, and many others.

The Big Nine Beichman attacks are actually nine tales from what could be called the new *American Metamorphosis*, a retelling of the pretty poetics of Ovid — though in Kafkaesque terms. In these nine stories a collective voice known as the American intellectual (sometimes, it seems, *any* American intellectual) invents America. Each tale assumes an enormous metaphorical significance attached to the word "America" as the poet-intellectual explores his native land via the symbolic politics syndrome. The American intellectual thereby institutionalizes the Poetic Image as Truth in lieu of mere facts.

That the poetic image can and often does signify truth in literature is obvious, but that the metaphor in politics is equally veridic is to assume reality and fantasy are identical. Not only politicians but also intellectuals — who, of course, pride themselves on keeping their hands clean of dirty politics — tend to substitute their own vision of the universe for the more prosaic one. In this case, the very liberal-to-radical American intellectual type has reinvigorated the *imago mundi* as mad house. Amerika the insane asylum is now described as that fascist, genocidal, violent, materialistic, guilty-of-everything, racist, hypocritical — have I left anything out? — world gone mad.

The nine lies attacked are the following: (1) "America is a fascist country," (2) "America means genocide," (3) "The Bomber Left is a moral force," (4) "The American worker is a 'Honky'," (5) "Our political system is a fraud," (6) "American values are materialistic," (7) "America is insane," (8) "The American people are guilty," and (9) "America needs a violent revolution."

With the choice of these nine particular distortions of America, Beichman has hit on the all too frequent abuse of words, language, and meaning. As he says, the usual linguistic technique applied by the "lynchers of America" is "the adaptation of an adjective as a seeming qualifier to a noun with an absolute meaning" (p. 61). A case in point is the term "fascist." Beichman points out that most of the American intellectuals quoted by him do not really *appear* to know what fascism is. The fascist model proposed by scholars such as N. Kogan and Franz Neumann (see "Fascism as a Political System," by N. Kogan in *The Nature of Fascism*, ed. by S. J. Woolf, New York, Random House, 1968; and also *Behemoth: The Structure and Rise of National Socialism, 1933-1944* by Franz Neumann, New York, Octagon Books, 1963, for further explanation of the fascist political system) is ignored completely in favor of the paradox of "non-fascist fascism" (p. 36). And "by constant reiteration that America is pre- or proto-fascist, America *becomes* fascist. . ." (p. 43). In much the same manner we are presented with "cultural fascism," "educational fascism," and fifty-seven other varieties of "fascism," none of which have anything to do with a strict definition of fascism and all of which contribute to the corruption and pollution of our language.

The litany of oft-repeated distortions becomes a ritual in which wish is confused with reality. One is reminded of the noted anthropologist Sir James George Frazer and his work on principles of magic among primitives. In *The Golden Bough*, Frazer discusses what he calls "homoeopathic or imitative magic" and "contagious magic," declaring that: "Homoeopathic magic is founded on the association of ideas by similarity; contagious magic is founded on the association of ideas by contiguity." (Sir James George Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, New York, Macmillan Company, abridged edition, 1960, p. 13.) Whether through similarity or contiguity the American intellectual in question seems to think that repetition and incantation of the words themselves — his words —

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have the power to bring about the reality; that, in fact, the words *are* the reality. Thus it becomes acceptable to lament, in pseudo-hysterical terms, the advent of fascist America, materialistic America, or even genocidal America without worrying about the particular appropriateness of such adjectives, let alone their truthfulness. Words such as "genocidal" or "racist" are transformed into a higher linguistic reality that often has little to do with the true meaning or significance of the words.

It is this apocalyptic vision of America to which Beichman powerfully objects. He uses to good advantage the very quotes of the American intellectuals discussed, although at times there seems to be a superabundance of quotes. One might also criticize an occasional superficiality in the book, but it is in the nature of a polemic, especially one organized into ten or so short essays, to be unable to explore fully the implications of so many issues.

One of the best features of the book is the elegant and provocative essay by Tom Wolfe. In his usual delightfully well-written style he extends the analysis which was implicit in *Radical Chic* (and somewhat more explicit in *Mau-Mauing the Flak Catchers*) to its logical conclusion. This section alone would justify the price of admission.

Finally, the book may be viewed as another blow by anti-Communist liberalism against the with-it New Politics. Beichman, along with Nathan Glazer, Norman Podhoretz, Ben Wattenberg and others, has recently joined in the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, a group of moderate to liberal progressives united in their desire to recapture the Democratic party from the crazies. The initial literature released by this new group is remarkably similar to much of *Nine Lies About America*. Although conservatives might criticize Beichman for not going far enough in particular criticisms, the book is a needed step toward returning sanity to the nation's intellectual and political life.

Wayne H. Valis

Book Review

What You Can Do

about Inflation, Unemployment, Productivity, Profit and Collective Bargaining

by Lemuel R. Boulware
Loeffler & Co. $1.35 pb.

1973 has ushered in a crisis of false expectations. Too many of us expect to take more from the system than we contribute. Question: Whose fault is this? Government? Unions or business? Answer: Neither!

It is basically the fault of the individual citizen who makes up that majority which determines the outcome of elections and which, *between elections*, determines the crucial impact of public opinion on both the expectation and actuality of pay, prices, taxes, savings, legislation, and — as the combined result of all these — of personal and economic freedom. This typical member of the majority just does not now have enough information to live up to the responsibilities his own freedom demands of him. Specifically, he lacks three things: an adequate understanding of our economy and the popular "something for nothing" philosophy which threatens its well-being, a moral determination to correct what is going wrong, and the political sophistication that will help him decide how and how not to correct it.

This citizen needs help. If he does not quickly achieve the competence and alertness which his own interests require for guiding his own acts and those of his representatives, he will be destroyed by the Frankenstein he created. Under the present circumstances this help will not come through the usual channels of corrective education. It must come from new or converted "thought-leaders" working directly with their fellows, discussing with them how each individual can more effectively bring about the high-productivity, low-unemployment, pollution and inflation free society we all desire. The reader, it is assumed, is or soon will be such a "thought-leader"!

The above just about sums up the thesis and purpose of a lively new book with what must be the longest self-explanatory title in publishing history: *WHAT YOU CAN DO about Inflation, Unemployment, Productivity, Profit, and Collective Bargaining*. As could be expected from the long-controversial author, Lemuel R. Boulware, the book challenges the current consensus and offers facts and analyses desperately needed by the public at the grass roots, but previously considered too sacrosanct for widespread public examination at that or any other level.

The book is not just a problem stater. It forthrightly answers such currently pertinent questions as these:

What's the real cause of inflation? Who's responsible? What's the only cure? Who alone can do it?

Who profits or loses when productivity rises or falls?

Are unions now weaker or stronger than they should be in worker interest? In consumer interest? In home-owner and taxpayer interest?

Who is responsible for the good and bad which politicians promise and do in office?

Do controls in the end result in higher or lower wages, prices, employment, profit, future values, and the availability of bottom-of-the-line models most needed by lower-income citizens?

Are pay increases now more or less than the productivity increases from improvements in equipment and methods? Who determines what pay increases will be? What determines how high or low the standard of living will be?

What is really the matter with collective bargaining?

Was the U.S. citizen's freedom won from King George III for good? Or does it have to be won all over again everyday?

The chapter on political sophistication at the beginning of the book tells us why the public point of view is so important and how our current crisis, and the political solutions that must remedy it, can be handled by the responsible, voluntary decision-making of each person. Boulware warns us not to credit political institutions with being all-wise and all-powerful. The interests and intelligence of individual members of the public, he writes, have always been more important: "even in a dictatorship, the ruler dares not go much beyond what the public majority rightly or wrongly believes at the moment is what should be done." All previous attempts at a free society have failed because of the incompetence and cupidity of most of the citizens who made up the voting majority and exercised the force of majority opinion. Action must begin now, he concludes, because there is evidence ours is failing for the same reason.

Chapter III ("The Moral Requirement") calls our attention to the "organized free loading" which is just as destructive as the also prevalent individual theft. It is emphatic that our freedom and well-being have both a moral base and a moral requirement. We must not only know what we ought to do in the individual and common interest, but — for very practical reasons, if for no other — we must also do that voluntarily even when no one is looking.

Chapter IV examines problems ("Inflation, Unemployment, Productivity, and Profit") which have caused the majority heartbreaking disillusionment and require no small amount of corrective study if the majority wants to handle competently its own interests. Take inflation for example. Boulware stresses the hard fact that inflation does *not* come from war, or from business greed, or from government supplying its citizens with services for which they are willing to pay. Inflation comes *only* from government being forced or allowed by the sovereign majority to create extra money (and credit) where there are no extra goods and services to match. Our government has been running its worthless money mill for two, politically-imposed reasons:

(1) To provide the money for government to pay for those goods and services which the public majority wants or permits some or all of the public to receive at so-called "government expense." The public majority loosely assumes this money comes from somewhere else, though the individual member would flatly *refuse* to pay the cost if he knew he was paying the bill.

(2) To pump out added worthless cash to increase the number and cut the value

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of all our dollars, so that consumers will have enough cheapened dollars to buy at the higher prices.

What follows in *WHAT YOU CAN DO*—rewarding to some and shocking to others — is an extensive treatment of how business really operates, who pays the expenses, and who, ultimately, benefits from business' profit. (Myths about exorbitant profit-margins are finally laid to rest!) The whole chapter is a very worthwhile exercise not only in debunking promises of "something for nothing" through unions, business, or government, but also in re-enthroning the economics, morals, and politics of "something for *something*" as the basis on which to seek genuine well-being.

Chapter V is likely to surprise readers both on and off campus. It explains in detail the wide gap that has developed between good union theory and bad, current union practice. It deals at length with the costly abuses the public majority has allowed to grow up: the monopoly of employment opportunity, the compulsory financial support of political activities contrary to member wishes, and the legally and illegally privileged violence to persons and property of members and nonmembers alike.

Boulware concludes that the suffering public is itself not only responsible for its own injury to itself, but is also the only agency which can demand and get the reform which the public so needs in labor law and its administration.

All in all, this little book presents a big challenge to "thought-leaders" on and off campus. So, thought-leaders: to arms! Beg, buy, or borrow the book and share its contents with your family and friends.

John T. McCarty

Book Review

Inveighing We Will Go

by William F. Buckley, Jr.
Putnam, $7.95

"You get to wondering though, whether, in the old phrase, you're playing horse to other people's Lady Godiva."

Bill Buckley says this in a completely different context, but the sentiment could well apply to his role in what we call "the conservative movement." Those of us who consider ourselves part of that movement have come to take him so much for granted that we tend to forget just how long we've ridden on his shoulders.

For years, Buckley did it all by himself. He was our debater and, when necessary, our politician. He established the first and best journal of the responsible American Right. And he made it possible for people to call themselves "conservative" without automatically evoking memories of European fascism.

Buckley was an unabashed conservative during those days when it was unfashionable in the extreme to be identified with the Right. We tend to forget this now, of course, for the excesses of the sixties brought on a great national change of sentiment, a change that has finally managed to reach even the universities, the inhabitants of which tend to be the people most isolated from the mainstream of American thought and opinion. Today we hear professors at Ivy League universities mouthing sentiments that they would have branded as reactionary a decade ago, sentiments that were being articulated by Bill Buckley in the days when our new-found academic allies were preaching the dogmas that led to the very excesses they now so piously deplore (somehow, I suppose, the world can never be the same to a professor of liberal arts when a student, pursuing that professor's ideas to their logical end, defecates in his wastebasket.)

Bill Buckley now stands pretty much where he stood in 1955. But given the violent lurch to the Left of the 1960s, his has become the fashionable spot on which to stand. A magazine like *Commentary*, for instance, aimed at an intellectual liberal readership, now often sounds like the *National Review* of a decade ago. This may all change, of course. When students are finished with defecating in wastebaskets, and when a new Kennedyish golden boy takes us on another great imperialist adventure, the academic types will probably once again begin to lurch leftward. And when they do, there will be just a few men like Bill Buckley holding down that center spot for them until such time as they once more come scurrying back for shelter.

They'll forget, of course. They're already forgetting, in fact — and most of them never have admitted it — that Bill Buckley was right and they were wrong. But that's to be expected. No one likes to admit that the ideology which has shaped his life is not only wrong but positively harmful. What should *not* be expected, however, is that American conservatives themselves forget just how much they owe to Bill Buckley.

The tendency is to take him for granted. I know I do. When I first saw *Inveighing We Will Go* I skimmed it, read the few pieces I'd missed when they originally appeared in *National Review, The New York Times Book Review*, or his newspaper columns. That took about an hour.

Then came the assignment from *The Alternative*, and I was forced to look more carefully — and to realize how much I'd missed during the past few years.

Not too long ago I believed Bill Buckley to be the best contemporary nonfiction writer in the country, a belief shared by most of the writing conservatives of my generation. But somewhere along the line—probably when we developed our own styles, acquired our own modest readerships (and along with them a steadily inflating sense of our own abilities) — we began to forget just a bit the man we had all once so desperately attempted to emulate.

But a careful reading of *Inveighing We Will Go* serves to remind us of what we easily forget—Bill Buckley is a better writer than the whole bunch of us, perhaps better than anyone practicing the craft of non-fiction today.

Inveighing is crammed with quotable passages, laced with that patented Buckley wit. But look beneath that wit for a second and consider the carefully crafted literary setting that supports it. A typical passage, chosen at random, describing his trip from an airport into Moscow:

"The drive into Moscow. It is Sunday, late afternoon, during the equivalent of the Western weekend rush hour. I didn't count, but I am certain we did not see twenty passenger cars along the 25-mile routes. It was a Vlaminck sky, dark gray, white white. At the little gate of Spaso House was the guard supplied by the Soviet Union—by common acknowledgment, he is a member of the KGB. (Fair enough. Ours probably reports to the FBI.) He saluted us through, and I got out into the enormous, oddly-structured town house completed for a Moscow industrialist in 1917 (1917!), and used by us as an official residence ever since F.D.R. sent William C. Bullitt as our first post-Czarist ambassador, Maxim Litinov having promised him that Russia would absolutely honest Injun give up subverting the world."

Consider just how much literary craftsmanship goes into the construction of such a passage. First of all the compression—perhaps partially the result of the discipline necessary in writing newspaper columns—the apparent ease with which he carries us on a relatively long trip through a strange countryside in one brief paragraph. (And were this a Ph.D. thesis, this narrative gift alone would be worth at least one chapter.) But despite the compression, nothing significant is omitted. There's just enough detail — the traffic and the implied comparison between two civilizations, the perfectly spare metaphorical lesson contained in the quick description of Spaso House. Most of us would go on and on, but he does it succinctly, deftly, with the apparent ease possible only to the craftsman who has completely mastered his art.

The wit is still there, perhaps more compact, but as sharp as ever, especially when he makes on-the-scene observations. (Travel seems to energize him.) He journeys to Zagorsk, "the spiritual home of Russia, where one of the three surviving seminaries continues the hapless production of a dozen priests per year, like eyedropping holy water into hell."

Into Poland, after Russia, where "a visitor can open his window in the morn-

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ing and feel that he knows now, with certitude, what is the difference between Purgatory and Hell."

To Yugoslavia, where he discovers "an avuncular Tito (as distinguished from the Tito who not so long ago used to like to tell the lightning bugs when to shine.)"

In China, after witnessing an anti-western opera: "It was as if at a White House conference of African presidents, we had taken them over to the Kennedy Center to see a ballet of Li'l Black Sambo."

You can string these quotes together endlessly, like popcorn balls for the Rockefeller Center Christmas tree. But the point is that Buckley's wit, that quality which enables him to make the seemingly effortless imaginative leap from general observation to precisely the right metaphor to dramatize that observation, is the very essence of art. That's what art is all about; that's what distinguishes the natural writer from the trained journeyman; and that's something they'll *never* be able to teach you at the Famous Writers' School.

It was the wit, I think, that drew so many of us to Bill Buckley back in the fifties. I still remember being bowled over by *Up From Liberalism*, delighted that we finally had a writer who could take on the social and political absurdities of our time, and take them on with such joy and effervescence.

Some of that effervescence is gone now, and long-time Buckley admirers must regret its passing, just as we regret what we leave behind as we slide into middle age. Bill Buckley still can seem, on the whole, lighthearted, but he bubbles just a bit less now, and perhaps that is just as well, for it allows those who mistook him for an entertainer to catch a glimpse of what he really is—a deeply sincere man, profoundly concerned for the fate of his nation.

This concern is most eloquently expressed in his description of the China trip. And no matter how you feel about that trip—I, personally, think it was necessary and resulted, among other things, in the end of the Vietnam war—no matter how you feel about it, you must agree that the embarrassing effusiveness of the visitors was painful. Just think of the whole flap over acupuncture, for instance—rationalist western intellectuals turning out reams of copy, with complete suspension of disbelief, on such things as the metaphysical qualities of gold and silver needles and the concepts of ying and yang. And one suspects that were the Red Chinese to practice phrenology or alchemy or baby eating, these enlightened men of the West would have approved them just as uncritically.

Why this fawning fascination with a society of dehumanized ants, a society that symbolizes everything antithetical to what Americans supposedly cherish? Bill Buckley has the answer:

"Somehow the generic incantation which instantly used to collapse such analyses—*Mussolini made the trains run on time*—doesn't have its ancient power to restore instantly the focus. The reason is that the West, so far gone these days in a rare combination of satiety and self-abuse, is indifferent in part to freedom, in whole to the cause of freedom. By contrast the Chinese Communists are not indifferent. They are proof against western derision because they know what they want, are utterly outspoken in their consecration to human debasement as a means of achieving Communism, lucid and unswerving in their designs, insouciant to the resentment we used to feel at the corruption of the terms that used to designate our ideals: justice, liberty, individual rights, government as the servant of the people."

I know of no more profound and eloquent passage in the writings of *any* contemporary author. (Note again the superb imagery here—the "rare combination of satiety and self abuse," the image of depraved sexuality strikingly dramatizing the reaction of the tired and the effete to the vital and the masculine.) This paragraph expresses nothing less than a total world view, profoundly pessimistic in the same sense that Whittaker Chambers was pessimistic when he told us in *Witness* that he realized leaving Communism for the West meant leaving the winning side for the losing.

The role of the satirist is a peculiar one. His function is to attack those aberrations that cause men to veer from the norm. The norm being that which the many of us have decided it is—free-enterprise capitalism in the United States, for instance, democracy — the satirist, although apparently always on the attack, is in a larger sense *defending*. His method, ridicule, suggests lightheartedness, for he is intent on laughing people out of their vices. Underneath that mask of laughter, however, most inevitably lurks a great sadness, for just as the policeman's daily work must inevitably lead him to suspect that men are aberrant wretches, so must the satirist's daily duties tend to persuade him that man seems intent on institutionalizing his vices and destroying his virtues. The satirist, in short, may seem to be having a hell of a lot more fun than the rest of us. And if he convinces us that he is, then he is a consummate artist. But let's try to remember, just occasionally, that there's probably one hell of a lot of agony just beneath the surface of that laughing mask. And without getting maudlin, let's remember that that agony grows out of a consistent concern for all of us.

Perhaps it's just because Bill Buckley is so good at what he does that his abilities as a writer fail to receive the attention they deserve. Satirists tend to make dullards uneasy, and those people in charge of nurturing serious literary

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
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reputations—professors of literature and reviewers for most major eastern magazines—tend to be footnote-numbed or ideological dullards. Hardly the types, in other words, to champion the abilities of someone who lampoons the very essence of their ideological dullness. (And isn't it indicative of something that a minor-league satirist like Kurt Vonnegut receives more attention in American literature courses than H.L. Mencken? Or that Ph.D. candidates are grinding out dissertations on — believe it or not — Norman Mailer?)

In a better world, any sensible head of a university department of literature, having read Bill's review in *Inveighing* of the two-volume edition of *The Oxford English Dictionary*, would offer him immediately an endowed chair. There is nothing in any of the scores of journals in which English professors publish their pleonastic little pieces that can touch it. A model of its kind—witty, polished, sophisticated, and above all *scholarly*, a throwback to the days when the great academicians wrote for *all* literate men, rather than for promotion.

But we must be realistic, and in the world as it is we probably won't live to see Bill Buckley's work receive the serious attention it deserves. I am confident, however, that we'll not forget how much his writing has meant to us. He's been one hell of a horse, and I doubt we'll soon come up with that Lady Godiva fit to ride him.

John R. Coyne, Jr.

Book Review

Sadness

by Donald Barthelme
Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, $5.95

In the sixteen short stories of his second collection titled *Sadness* Donald Barthelme presents us with a new perspective into his wildly growing talent. As good a starting point as any is "The Flight of Pigeons from the Palace," with its nineteenth century decoupage style illustration of "My Father Concerned About His Liver" — in which a story-high bust peers reflectively into a palace arcade at his equally gigantic inner organs.

Perhaps my own reaction was unique, but after a first reading, I concluded I had had a dizzying, wonderful, intermittently painful experience with these stories, somehow reminiscent of my encounter long ago with an old-timey laughing gas dentist.

And the reader will be strongly drawn to a rereading, as I was, almost hypnotically in the power of these disjointed cubistic flashes of Donald's fictional genius — tormented by Barthelme's deliberately grotesque axioms, such as, "A Steinway is a known quantity, whereas an analysis can succeed or fail."

(Just a moment. A perhaps imaginary green Railway Express truck, very much in the manner of Barthelme, seems to be delivering me a message about his style — a stainless steel field studded with scissors and paste pots, courtesy of his models, the *New Yorker*, the *Atlantic*, Kafka, Simon Suggs, George Washington Harris, and Mark Twain himself. I agree, Donald. "This is an interesting phenomenon and should be investigated.")

Back to the point! First, let's — in Donald's free-wheeling manner — stick it to "Critique de la Vie Quotidienne." Here I inhaled the acrid odor of marital quarreling, perhaps the most pungent among his fifty-seven flavors. A story full of Wanda, a slovenly bitch, who ends up studying Marxist sociology at Nanterre, no doubt after seeing Godard's *La Chinoise* too many times.

"Perpetua," on the other hand, tires of talking about the revolution, plays her fourth-chair trumpet in the New World Symphony Orchestra, and concludes after leaving her TV watching husband, "An Irish setter is what I do not need." Hop scotch on to a story called "The Sandman," dear kiddies of a larger growth, in which the real enemy is Susan's shrink, Doctor Hodder. The Doc can't seem to realize that Susan's piano is more valuable to her than analysis.

So much for your triangles, Donald. Now for your squares. Let's start with your fiction about "The Genius," who may or may not contain within himself a false man of genius, but certainly is rattling around ironical sherds of Dreiser's *The "Genius"* (I hope, Donald, you're saying *touche* to yourself as you see the correct form of the title.) Along with his Dreiser sherds, the Genius possesses the most important tool of genius today: rubber cement, plus four cases of Teacher's Highland Cream, historical forces, subincised genitals, a subscription to *Harper's Bazaar* a failure to win the Nobel Prize this year, and — a gift from the good people of Cincinnati — the complete works of the Venerable Bede.

Next square, Mr. Phillips of "A City of Churches," who needs only Cecilia and her branch office of a car-rental agency to make his bell-ridden city complete, even though she threatens to dream things he won't like, such as the Secret. And, in "The Temptation of St. Anthony," the Saint himself, strangely reminiscent of that bowing saint good old Mark Twain once hitched to a sewing machine for a seven year stint of sacred shirts.

(And dare I count among my squares, Donald, that illustrated one in the story mentioned above, "The Flight of Pigeons from the Palace"? Just a little too much kooky-chic?)

Then some near misses, Donald, where fictional cutesey may make some cotton-tailed readers fwow up. At least in the story "Departures" you borrowed a good subplot from that ole black writer Chestnutt (but why no credit line — Donald? Watch out, or the NAACP may get you for acknowledging your debt to Kafka, but not to that oldest of black fictional geniuses).

But the stories "Traumerei," "Daumier," "The Catechist" — lists upon Lizsts in your Homerical catalogue of ships style. And those Godard questions! As Mark Twain would say, it's too many for me, or for what you, yes I mean you Donald, call myself, my misplaced self, my self-abuse, my self-love.

But your best stories Donald, these are your animal fables. What a gift — you're a marvelous fabulist, a new Aesop. With your story of King Kong revived to go to "The Party" as adjunct professor of art at Rutgers. And your dog Charles in the fiction titled "Subpoena" — a dog who is 44 percent metal, a dog with whom everything is all right, even his own disassembly (did you want us at times to spell his name backwards?) — Oh to have a dog, a wife, a mistress, a congressman, like Charles. Right on, Donald.

But Donald, when it comes to your political stories, and even the title of your collection, what are you trying to tell us in "The Rise of Capitalism"? Do you mean to argue that all our sadness comes mainly from the contemplation of capitalism? Hy Marx, Low Nixonomics, Sacred Mao Cows — especially Krishna Socialism. By the ele-

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Hain't we got all the fools in town on our side? And ain't that a big enough majority in any town?

— Huckleberry Finn

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

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phant god you swear on, Donald, this must stop!

And your own light fantastic trip, Donald, perhaps is the better answer, as in your supreme fiction, "Engineer-Private Paul Klee Misplaces an Aircraft between Milbertshofen and Cambrai, March, 1916." What a childish, Kafkaesque, expressionistic, original jewel of a story!

And as for your collection, *Sadness*, as a whole, fantastic, Donald! Get set, on your Mark Twain, go, gentle reader. In Donald's phrase, chocolates and paintings forever!

John Ashmead



Thoughts on the Current Crises

To judge from what we read in the papers and are told by our leaders and pundits, we are now living through one of the most perilous, most fearsome periods in American history. Consider the evidence: For something approaching a year now, the nation has been caught in the grips of a severe energy crisis and has as yet done nothing to alleviate it. In January this bad situation became worse when a bitter constitutional crisis erupted over the nature and very existence of the powers of Congress. Then came an international dollar crisis after which we were staggered by an explosive food price inflation crisis, on the heels of which there followed an emerging Watergate crisis. And the future seems to promise more of the same. According to the defenders of our civil liberties, the nation is rushing headlong into a crisis of press freedom and of the First Amendment as a whole, and before that happens the imposition of food price controls should long since have precipitated a drastic meat shortage crisis as predicted by Secretary Butz in an earlier incarnation. All in all, things look pretty dismal. Apparently, the keepers of that rough Beast have finally turned him loose on the world, and our very survival — as a free and democratic nation, as an economic system, as a Judao-Christian civilization, as an energy-consuming, meat-eating people — now hangs in the balance. Granted that nobody has yet formulated our current situation in precisely these terms, but on the evidence of all these crises, what else is one to conclude?

The answer, of course, depends on which evidence one looks at. According to the headlines and the statements of our political grandees, we are indeed eyeball to eyeball with a new stone age, and the hands of the clock stand at one minute to midnight. But if one disregards the public discourse for a moment and consults the evidence of one's own experience, a different picture emerges. Nobody is in a panic, gloom does not prevail. Indeed, things in general seem to be looking up. Of course there are some problems. Gasoline prices seem to be up a bit; some people had trouble getting all the heating oil they wanted during the winter; New York City has occasional brownouts on hot summer days. Food prices are up, like everything else, but so far wages have kept pace. There do seem to be some disputes in Washington, as usual. The President refuses to spend money appropriated by Congress, which seems questionable inasmuch as his veto was overridden; but then Congress has appropriated more than it should have, given the level of the economy and the rate of taxation, which seems equally questionable. The President also seems to be resisting a not unpolitical investigation into whether White House staff members knew about an espionage operation run by his campaign organization. The Supreme Court held that newsmen have to testify in court like everyone else, and now the newsmen are trying to get Congress to pass a law exempting them from this duty. In short, the situation seems no more than normally abnormal, and offers no special cause for alarm. Life not only could be worse — it has in fact been worse, and not so very long ago at that.

Now it is easy — and some people find it terrific fun — to ridicule this latter kind of evidence and to denounce it as unfit for introduction into the court of public opinion. To Art Hoppe, for instance, this "everyday-life" perspective is personified by "Joe Sikspak," a brutish, hypocritical clod of a person who is intended to invite our contempt for his self-centered insensitivity, his unawareness of the world, and his indifference to the "important" things. But in fact "Joe" is a grotesque caricature who deserves only our resolute disbelief. For the real-life Joe, as opposed to Hoppe's fabrication, is each of us as we live our daily lives — which is to say he is imperfect, fallible, and guilty of a multitude of sins, yet also sensible, decent, and not without imagination or concern for others. This real Joe possesses skills and personal resources, and one of them is the ability to tell a real crisis when it descends on him. During the Cuban missile crisis, which suddenly created a real possibility of nuclear war, he knew there was danger. In 1967 and 1968, when the social and political order really did seem to be breaking down, he was deeply upset and genuinely apprehensive. In 1970 and 1971, when unemployment and inflation began to rise rapidly despite efforts to control them, he was, being no dummy, actively worried. Today, by contrast, he is aware of any number of problems in the nation and difficulties in his own life, but he is not aware of a general crisis. If anyone suggested that one existed, he would blink in disbelief, and he would be right.

Incidentally, one of the surest ways to tell a real crisis from a phony one is to observe how the people involved speak of it. If they actually use the word "crisis," you may be certain that it is not a crisis, but only an overdramatized problem. Real crises, in which the lives and ways of people actually do hand in the balance, are almost never described as such. At Harvard, for instance, where we went through genuine crises in 1969 and 1970, people have never called them that. While they were going on and during their immediate aftermath, they were referred to as "the recent events"; and even now, when they are safely a part of history, people persist in speaking of them euphemistically, as "April 1969" or "May 1970" or some other vague entity. When people are involved in a real crisis, they feel the fact only too keenly. The word itself is unnecessary to them, and using the word would require them to achieve a distance from the experience of the crisis that they do not have, do not want, and do not seek. During a crisis one is afraid of what *might* happen; afterwards, one is often no less fearful of confronting what *did* happen.

So on the evidence of our senses, including common sense, there is no way the present time can reasonably be interpreted as a time of grave crisis — and yet, in spite of this plain fact, our pundits and leaders persist in announcing the onset of any number of crises, large and small. The question naturally arises: What accounts for this gross disparity between reality and the depiction of reality in the public discourse? Why all this talk about crisis at a time that is, if not altogether serene, then at least thoroughly unapocalyptic?

Well, some parts of the answer are apparent enough. For one thing, our news media are constitutionally committed to a method of exaggeration. To them, a problem that is small and little discussed doesn't exist at all; by contrast, a problem that is only somewhat larger and a bit more widely talked-of not only exists, but becomes, in their front pages, nothing less than a mortal threat to the republic itself. The area

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in between these extremes is largely *terra incognita* to our mass media, yet it is precisely in this middling ground that most of the public business is to be found. Second, there is the fact that ritualistic hysteria has established itself among our cosmopolitan intellectuals as the preferred mode of expressing interest in public affairs. To such persons, speaking of our public problems fearfully and with an exaggerated sense of foreboding is the norm, and is considered the hallmark of an especially fine sensibility. Then, too, the seriousness and prudence of our governing class also contribute to the tendency of American public discussion to announce danger and crisis at every fresh turn of events. Persons with experience of the world know that the future is perversely unpredictable. They therefore are alert to the fact that in every innocent event there lurks some potential danger, that the most humdrum problem contains within it the seeds of catastrophic disaster, and that when something can go wrong it will — except of course when it doesn't.

Meet

Murray N. Rothbard

Economist. Historian. Polemicist. Social Critic. Architect of Liberty


MAN ECONOMY AND STATE
POWER AND MARKET
Government and the Economy
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The Libertarian Manifesto:
The chief spokesman for libertarianism - a new political movement that synthesizes precepts of the far left and far right - spells out the philosophy that will both protect your liberties and pave your streets.
Murray N. Rothbard

"With the publication of *For A New Liberty*, the new libertarian movement takes a giant step forward. Here is Professor Murray N. Rothbard as economist, as historian, as social philosopher and critic, as pundit and as a devoted lover of liberty. Only history will tell, but it seems very likely that *For A New Liberty* will take its place among the great libertarian classics.

Showing the uniqueness of libertarianism, Rothbard explains why libertarians, while exhibiting aspects of both, are neither Left nor Right on the current spectrum of political thought. From the Left, libertarians take an absolute distrust of plutocratic concentrations of power in combination with the State. Also from the Left, libertarians take a willingness to call for radical programs to mobilize public opinion and public action to get the State out of people's lives. From the American "Old Right" libertarians adopt the ideas of individualism, private property and the free market.

Rothbard then undertakes to explain and legitimize, in terms of natural law, his "non-aggression axiom." The key to libertarianism, in his view, is *justice in property*. It is his contention that once this first axiom and just property rights are established and understood, then the rest of libertarian doctrine is merely the "spinning out" of the logical implications of this first principle. Building on this foundation, he demonstrates that society is merely the result of all the free and voluntary exchange relationships among individual self-owners.

Each in its turn, Rothbard applies libertarian principles to the practical questions which have to be answered by any economic system. Does the government have to provide clothing for its people? Of course not. Then why education, streets, roads and other "public services"? Applying sound economic reasoning, Rothbard finds no reason why the market cannot provide all of these services. And then he takes up the ultimate question. If the market can fulfill all conceivable consumer's needs, including education and public services, then why not protection and judicial services? Why not, indeed, asks Rothbard, who then offers a meticulous marginal analysis of the question. His conclusion is that the market can provide the optimal amount of protection and judicial needs of society, just as it can, and when allowed to do so, does for all of society's other needs.

At last the libertarian movement offers a highly readable, logically and empirically consistent book which can be recommended to the person who asks: "What is libertarianism?" It may well prove to be one of the most important books Liberty has ever had written in her behalf. Be sure to buy a copy and read it for your own enjoyment and edification, buy one for a friend and make sure your local or school library has this book on its shelves." ❞

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Adapted from a review in *Books For Libertarians*, April, 1973

Other Books By Murray N. Rothbard

MAN ECONOMY AND STATE/A systematic treatise on economic principles, this work is an exhaustive treatment in which every step of the case for laissez-faire is made explicity clear. *MAN ECONOMY AND STATE* is perhaps the best work in economics presently available—an invaluable reference work, and a brilliant work in social philosophy.

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AMERICA'S GREAT DEPRESSION/Rothbard presents the Austrian theory of depressions, refutes opposing theories (including that of Keynes) and shows how the government, through the Federal Reserve System, was the cause of the 1929 Depression.

WHAT HAS GOVERNMENT DONE TO OUR MONEY?/In this brief work, Rothbard shows the nature, origins and functions of money in a free market, and shows the devastating effects of government intervention in this key "command post" of the economy.

A NEW HISTORY OF LEVIATHAN/(with Ronald Radosh) A unique collaboration between Left and Right-wing revisionist historians, this collection of essays focuses on the development of the corporate state since Woodrow Wilson. An important overview of some of the essentials of 20th century political reality.

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The more prudent and responsible they are, the more likely they will be to overestimate the dangers inherent in the current state of affairs.

All of this helps to explain why there is so much hyperbole in our public discourse, but it does not account for the intensity of this hyperbole or for the special form it assumes. It is one thing to exaggerate the gloomy side of things, and quite another to rush about shouting "crisis" at the slightest provocation. To some extent, no doubt, this latter sort of behavior reflects our national appetite for the symbolic satisfactions of talking apocalyptically. But when cool-eyed politicians and billion-dollar corporations are to be found leading the chorus of impending doom, as is often the case these days, it's a good bet that something more than mere expressiveness is at work.

Indeed there is something more, and it is called advocacy. It is not for the most part the sort of intellectualized advocacy that one finds in a debate where the object is to urge one course of action as opposed to another by building a logical case. It is instead a much more primitive and powerful form of advocacy, which addresses itself to the political rather than the intellectual problems of legislation. Politically, the objective of an advocate is to move people to act. (The objective of a debater, by contrast, is to move people to agree.) There are many ways to get people to act, but the best way is to persuade them of the existence of a serious problem that is getting worse and that therefore requires immediate action. Once they are persuaded of this, the problem will go to the top of their agenda for action — and once it is there, people will act, and something will usually be done. Exactly what gets done is influenced by many things, the most important of which is the way in which the people who act perceive the problem. Just as every solution implies a particular definition of the problem, so does every definition of the problem imply a particular solution. Thus, the trick for the political advocate is to get the problem on everyone's agenda, and to make sure that his definition of the problem is the one that prevails. If he succeeds in this, it becomes almost certain both that something will be done and that what finally is done will be more or less to his liking.

The idea of crisis provides the ideal rhetoric for this sort of advocacy. In part the word denotes a problem that is large, widespread, and intense. But that is not all that "crisis" means. A crisis is not just any sort of problem; it is, more precisely, a problem that is in the process of being resolved, for better or for worse, once and for all. It is a problem with a deadline. As such it is an emergency, and requires immediate governmental action. Normal deliberative processes may have to be suspended, objections based on principle may have to be ignored; something has to be done. Calling a problem a crisis is thus not only a way of getting the problem on the top of everyone's agenda for action, it is also a device both for forestalling the usual lengthy processes of scrutiny and analysis which attend legislative action and for persuading people to support a course of action which, under normal circumstances, they might oppose. Calling a problem a crisis, in short, is an ideal ploy for an advocate.

The use of "crisis" as a political rhetoric seems to date back to the New Deal, and has been a standard line of argument for liberal proposals and measures since that time. In the 1960s the word was used so frequently that it became virtually synonomous with "problem" — although it never entirely lost its connotation of emergency and deadline. Thus, the original (and still the central) meaning of the word has been corrupted. For in its earlier usage, "crisis" was a word that could only be used retrospectively, to designate the point in the past when a problem did in fact come to a head and finally resolved itself one way or another. It was a word for the historian. When one looks at Webster's Second, published in the 1930s, all the definitions conform to this retrospective sense of the word, which derives originally from the Greek "*krinein*," meaning "to separate." But in Webster's Third, published in the 1960s, the word is given an additional set of meanings: "an unstable set of affairs in which a decisive change is impending," or "a psychological or social condition characterized by an unusual instability caused by excessive stress and either endangering or felt to endanger the continuity of the individual or his group; especially such a social condition requiring the transformation of existing cultural patterns and values."

Thus, from having been a term that was retrospective and descriptive, "crisis" acquires the new sense of being prospective and prescriptive. The change in definition reflects the fact that the word has become a device of advocacy, no longer a means of identifying a turning point in the past, but a means of *creating* such a turning point in the present or near future.

The public discourse today is full of the sound and smell of crisis, not because we have finally arrived at the apocalypse, but only because crisis-mongering has become such a popular form of advocacy over the past decade. If there is anything interesting about our current crises, it is that some of them are *not* attached to liberal legislative programs as once was the case. Today, for example, we have not only the liberals' "constitutional crisis" — but also the oil companies' "energy crisis" and the journalists' "crisis of the First Amendment." To some, perhaps, this spreading of the rhetorical riches will seem a good thing. I myself am not so sure. For crisis-mongering is fundamentally a dishonest rhetoric, and a corrupting one. It expresses an unwillingness or inability to persuade people on the merits; it is the rhetoric of a demoralized and stalemated polity. It attempts to stampede people by scaring them and by promising a decisive turnabout in the course of events that will almost certainly not occur. The repeated use of the word also guarantees that in time we will stop listening to warnings of crisis; when a real crisis does occur, we may be unwilling to rise to the occasion, like the shepherd who heard the word "wolf" once too often.

There isn't an energy crisis. There isn't a crisis of the First Amendment. There isn't a "constitutional crisis," and there won't be a meat shortage crisis. There are only problems, confusing and mostly intractible — problems, and a small pack of policy hucksters trying to manipulate our hopes and fears and, in the bargain, corrupting the public discourse. □

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Book Review

The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War

by Robert James Maddox
Princeton, $7.95

Professor Maddox's book is a critical analysis of the work of seven revisionist historians (Williams, Fleming, Alperovitz, Horowitz, Kolko, Clemens, and Gardner). It is, I think, an historical contribution that deserves serious notice. It presents, however, a somewhat difficult problem to the reviewer. To deal with all of Maddox's criticisms, his citation of errors and of twisted interpretations, would be to write a review almost as long as the book itself. In what follows I have taken one recurrent theme, the question of Poland in the period between Yalta and Potsdam, and shown how justified Maddox is in his thesis.

But before undertaking this task, some general comments with regard to revisionism are in order. Broadly speaking, revisionism is too often history written with a predetermined thesis and with a double standard. It dwells upon the errors, real or assumed, of the United States, and never points out that the Russians were not precisely angels of light. Often based on economic factors, it ignores the immense complexity of international affairs, the role that sentiment and ideology play in human affairs, the interplay between economic and political motives that is essential to the understanding of large events, the role of individual personality, and in a democracy, the importance of the public mood. It is written with *a parti pris*, whereas the conscientious historian draws his conclusions from the data, rather than using the data to buttress a predetermined conclusion. Revisionism can be useful and provocative, particularly in exposing the nationalistic excesses of much conventional history, and the mistakes of our own policy. But it does not obey the canons of the best historical scholarship. This, I think, Professor Maddox has sought to illustrate.

And now let us look at the theme mentioned above, the question of Poland.

There is, of course, no debate on the contention that discussions on the Polish question played a significant part in the diplomacy of the period from Yalta to Potsdam. There was, no doubt, some heat in the discussions. But what the revisionists have failed to note (and what Professor Maddox has failed to mention) is that a compromise solution was reached on the Polish issue *before* the meeting at Potsdam took place. The flavor of the government set up by Russia in Poland was distasteful both to the United States and Great Britain. To it, at the insistence of the Americans and British, other elements were added. And the regime thus constituted was recognized by the United States. Though this compromise solution came unstuck in time, Poland was supplanted by Germany as the central subject of the succeeding debates of the great powers. To maintain that the dissension on the Polish issue was a central cause of the Cold War is not, in my judgment, in accord with the facts. Of the revisionists cited by Maddox, only Gardner seems to have any hint of this fact.

But let us look at the arguments used in connection with the Polish question.

The broadest approach comes from Professor Williams, the pioneer of the revisionist school. For Williams the heart of the Cold War problem is the desire of the United States for open markets. This idea is certainly not to be brushed aside. But the difficulty, in Williams' case, is the difficulty with all revisionists. It is the predilection for taking the part for the whole. The breach between the West and the Soviet Union is a complicated matter. That economic interests had something to do with it should be conceded, though only when it is realized that the connection between such an interest and a free society is fundamental. But there is a lot more to the matter.

To make economic interests central raises for Professor Williams a difficult question of which Professor Maddox takes full advantage. Williams cannot find many references to the Open Door in the correspondence on Poland. But he is equal to the occasion. He suggests that the Open Door approach was so well known that "it was not thought necessary to explain or defend it." This seems to the reviewer divination rather than history.

Great American Series

A man is a god in ruins.

— Ralph **Waldo Emerson**

The economic argument is used, of course, by other revisionists following Williams. But another favorite theme is that Roosevelt was conciliatory in dealing with the Soviet Union about Poland, and that Truman was bumptious and offensive. The fact already mentioned that the Polish government was recognized in July ought to shake this conclusion. But let us look at the arguments put forward. One of them rests on the fact that Truman, in conversation with his advisers, said that if the Russians did not come to San Fransicso, they could "go to hell." It seems a little unreasonable to attribute broad historical significance to a remark made in a private discussion. But the revisionists make another point. They refer to the sharp comments of the President in his conversation with Molotov on April 23. Sharp comments there were. But if one reads Truman's whole account of the interview they relate to little more than a plea to the Russian foreign minister for the Soviet Union to keep the engagements that it had made at Yalta. There is nothing incendiary about this. Furthermore, and all important, there is a fundamental despatch from Roosevelt which says exactly the same thing. It is published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, vol. 5, Europe. (Washington, 1967, p. 194.) It is only fair to Professor Williams to say that, as far as I know, it had not been published when he wrote. But three of the revisionists criticized by Maddox wrote after it and had seen the light. It would do them good to read or reread it.

One important piece of evidence on the identity of Roosevelt's and Truman's view was known earlier. It is Harriman's statement to Truman in April: "Frankly, one of the reasons that made me rush back to Washington was the fear that you did not understand, *as I had seen Roosevelt understand, that Stalin is breaking his agreements.*" This statement was completely neglected by Gar Alperovitz in detailing Harriman's views. It seems to me important.

The trouble is that the revisionists pay no attention to the course of events in the spring of 1945. The Russians had set up a left wing government in Poland, and were dragging their feet on the question of reconstituting it to meet the views of the West. They had placed that regime in control of a large chunk of territory; they had signed a defense treaty with it, and they had arrested fourteen Polish leaders whose views presumably they disapproved of. True, we had given the Russians a small voice in Italy, and were to give them a very small voice in Japan. But let us remember that after a short interval we gave up trying to control Eastern Europe.

My reference to the arrest of the fourteen Poles leads me to digress with a personal reminiscence. The question was brought up at the Conference of San Francisco which I attended in a modest capacity. Molotov consented to hold a press conference. "Will these Poles be tried?" he was asked. "They will be, if they are guilty." The explosion of laughter that followed somewhat confused the Russian foreign minister.

To return to the Maddox volume, Poland is by no means the only theme. His analysis of Alperovitz's picturesque theme that the dropping of the atom bomb was timed to make the Russians more amenable is published in *The Journal of American History* together with Alperovitz's reply. The reader can judge for himself. Maddox has some devastating criticism of Joyce and Gabriel Kolko's theory that the United States let the Russians down on the military side. There is some discussion of the reparations question.

But the central value of Maddox's book lies not in any particular criticism (some of Maddox's points are small ones), but in the warning it serves on all of us not to accept blindly anybody's historical judgments on the last twenty-seven years of American foreign policy. That applies to revisionists and more conventional historians alike.

Dexter Perkins

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Book Review

The United States and the Origins of the Cold War

by John Lewis Gaddis
Columbia University
$3.95 pb.

Over the past five years there have appeared an inordinate number of books on the origins of the Cold War. This is understandable. The frustrations of recent American foreign policies, most notably the war in Vietnam, have caused thoughtful Americans to call into question the context within which these policies have been formed. Unfortunately for the sake of better understanding the past, however, a distressing proportion of the recent volumes are without scholarly merit. This is particularly true of the influential New Left "revisionist" works, which purport to show that a militant, expansionist United States foisted the Cold War upon a Soviet Union whose sole concern was national security. Most of these books, in fact, are little more than propaganda tracts gussied up with academic paraphernalia. John L. Gaddis' *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* is something else. Though the author treats the revisionists far more seriously than the facts warrant, his is probably the best single volume on the subject now available.

Gaddis is sharply critical of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's wartime diplomacy, which he holds responsible for misleading the American people as to Soviet intentions. Roosevelt knew that Stalin meant to dominate Eastern Europe when the fighting ended, according to Gaddis, and thought there was very little the United States could do about it. He tried, through personal diplomacy and material generosity (Lend Lease, for instance), to minimize the Russian dictator's suspicions of the West, in hopes of rendering this domination less onerous for the peoples involved. In his zeal to win the war as quickly and efficiently as possible, however, FDR failed to prepare the public for such an eventuality and encouraged the notion that Stalin sought *nothing* that would conflict with American war aims. Thus when Soviet intentions became clear at the war's end, both Congress and the American people reacted strongly to what they regarded as Russian duplicity.

Harry S. Truman, in *Origins*, had to deal with Roosevelt's chickens when they came home to roost. Gaddis argues convincingly that Truman at first tried to continue the Rooseveltian policy of accommodation with the Russians. But a combination of Stalin's heavy-handedness, Truman's own natural pugnacity, the increasing hostility of some of his key advisers, and congressional rumblings pushed him into ever more belligerent positions. This in turn caused Stalin — who understood Roosevelt to have implicitly sanctioned Soviet goals — to believe that the United States now sought to deprive Russia of the fruits of victory. The result was a kind of symmetrical elevation of hostilities: both sides interpreted specific acts by the other as threatening, and every retaliation heightened the tension that much more.

Gaddis' conclusion is that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union desired the Cold War, but both contributed to it out of fear, mutual suspicions, and misunderstanding, as well as genuinely conflicting goals. The basic error on the part of the United States, in his view, is that Americans incorrectly interpreted Russian actions in Eastern Europe as but the prelude to world conquest. Stalin, on the other hand, saw in United States' policies toward Eastern Europe and defeated Germany some devious plot, the purpose of which was to undermine Soviet security. All coalitions tend to come apart when the common danger is ended, and the war-born partnership between two such different societies was no exception.

Gaddis' book is stimulating and provocative throughout, however one may disagree with him. His emphasis upon the importance of Congress is particularly significant, for many scholars have written as though the Truman Administration operated in a vacuum. This reviewer parts company with the author on a number of issues: I think he underestimates the degree to which Roosevelt had moved to a "tougher" position by the time of his death, for instance, and his account of how American policymakers tried to coerce Russia economically seems to me unconvincing. There are some factual lapses as well. Unaccountably Gaddis repeats the myth concocted by revisionists that Secretary of State James F. Byrnes advised Truman in April 1945 that possession of the atomic bomb would enable the United States "to dictate its own terms at the end of the war" (p. 251), as though Byrnes were referring to Russia. The source for this remark, Truman's *Memoirs*, permits no doubt that in context Byrnes was referring not to Russia, but to Japan. The difference is crucial. Despite such slips, this book is very much worth reading.

Robert James Maddox

Book Review

The Politics of War

the World and U.S. Foreign Policy: 1943-1945

by Gabriel Kolko
Vintage, $3.45

In our present age of recurrent East-West tensions, it is pertinent to re-examine the origins of our frightful cold war. In *The Politics of War*, Gabriel Kolko joins a host of New Left historians in flagellating the United States for singlehandedly initiating the cold war.

During and after World War II, Kolko asserts, the United States pursued egocentric economic policies designed to promote "American global interests" through a "world capitalist state" under American supervision. The author further argues that the United States provoked and browbeat Russia, not because the Soviets were totalitarian, but because it posed a threat to America's capitalist hegemony — especially in Eastern Europe. Through Kolko's economic blinders, then, American policy was uniformly selfish and irrationally anti-Soviet.

For example, at Yalta, American objectives were "primarily economic in content," to further United States imperialism by promoting favorable American trade patterns. At Potsdam, Russian support was sought not only to conquer Japan, which many believed would require "perhaps a million or more men," but to render America "very tangible military aid" to protect "American interests in Manchuria." The author concludes that America wished to solidify its economic supremacy in China via an Open Door policy and a free port at Dairen.

According to Kolko, another theme pervading Potsdam was the insatiable American desire to introduce atomic weapons. Truman is protrayed as licking his chops "to drop the first bomb as soon as it was ready." Furthermore, "The Americans decided to use the bomb as a known and now predictable factor of war, an economical means of destroying vast numbers of men, women, and children, soldiers, and civilians. Well before August, 1945, they had reduced this to a routine." (For an antidote to these staggering Machiavellian speculations, see Herbert Feis, *The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II.*)

Kolko contrasts the belligerent and mercenary American policy with that of the benign and "anti-revolutionary" Soviet Union. Moderate Russia disregarded Poland and Yugoslavia and "had no intention of Bolshevizing Eastern Europe in 1945 if — but only if — they could find alternatives."

But as traditional historians see it, Russia was heavily involved in East European affairs. As early as 1941, Stalin insisted that the disputed land east of the Curzon line be granted to the Soviet Union after the war. Molotov further suggested that Soviet boundaries should extend into East Prussia. At the Teheran Conference in 1943, Russia reiterated this demand for East Prussian territory. By early 1945, Stalin recognized the Lublin government, a Soviet based regime, as the legitimate government of Poland. Furthermore, he demanded that the

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The Bootblack Stand

Dr. George Washington Plunkitt, our prize-winning political analyst, is celebrating the publication of his new book, which is now available at *avant-garde* bookstores throughout New Jersey. Dr. Plunkitt's book is about the importance of altruism in politics and it is titled *What's in It for Me?* Although Dr. Plunkitt expects to earn ten million dollars from sales of his new book, he has agreed to continue to advise public figures through this column. Address all correspondence to The Bootblack Stand, c/o The Establishment, R.R. 11, Box 360, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, Continental U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

Lately we have been hearing a lot of apple pie and mommery from the POW's even while millions of oppressed Indians are starving under the guns of U.S. marshalls at Wounded Knee and while no one raises a squeak about the tons of litter left by our government on the virginally beautiful face of the moon. Well, there is a stench about it all, a moral stench!!!

Not one of these POW's has yet paused to thank people like Jerry Rubin, David Dellinger, Abbie Hoffman, Arthur Bremer, or me for ending that goddamn war. We sacrificed for years to end that war, many of us imperiling our careers and mental well-being. Yet not a word of gratitude has come from these ingrates.

Not only are these guys war criminals, as Phil Berrigan has so eloquently said, but they are also very poorly bred. What kind of family would raise a person so lacking in amenities, social graces, and gracious living? Crud!

Power to the People
Jane Fonda, A.B.

Dear Citizen Fonda:

I think you have fallen hard for another of Dick's tricks. How can we be sure the war is over? I mean really, really over. And if it is over, what is Nixon up to anyway?

— GWP

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

As the whole world must know by now, at the height of the Vietnam war, I decided to oppose it by abstaining from all solid food until I brought that heinous war to an end and a conclusion. So now history will fain record that I am the first man ever to end a war by becoming emotionally involved with juices and linglonberry yogurt. I have lost so many pounds and even ounces that if I stand sideways and stick out my tongue, I am often mistaken for a zipper and occasionally for a skinny clown.

But now that I have ended the Vietnam war I have decided to get involved in still another battle for human justice. I am getting active in the gay lib movement. Last week a young gay couple, Ralph and Sid Bflum, were refused help at a local family planning organization. Now isn't it about time we take pregnancy for the serious disease that it is? Isn't it about time we help troubled young couples like Ralph and Sid to lead normal married lives free of the dread of unwanted children. What can I do to help?

Peace and Freedom
Brother Dick Gregory

Dear Mr. Gregory:

It seems to me that what the protest movement really needs is some cross-fertilization. I suggest that you marry Gloria Steinem and become pregnant. Your child is bound to be a jackass, and then you will have marshalled to your cause the women's fever, the buffoons, and a radicalized 4-H.

— GWP

Polish boundary be extended westward at German expense. To guarantee Soviet hegemony, American and British observers were not allowed entry into Poland.

Possibly Stalin's most deceitful and homicidal act, one which Kolko explains away, was the massacre of over 10,000 Polish officer-prisoners in the Katyn Forest during the early stages of the war. This was decimation on such a grand scale that, according to one survivor, some Russian soldiers committed suicide rather than obey orders to execute the Poles and pile them into mass graves. When these graves were discovered in 1943, the Polish government-in-exile requested an investigation. Russia promptly denied culpability, severed diplomatic relations with this London based administration, and organized a puppet government in Russia to assume postwar leadership in Poland.

After the war, Kolko insists that the anti-Nazi forces in France and Italy should have eventually formed communist states — had not the United States coerced them into following a different course. That these leftist elements constituted only a tiny minority of France's and Italy's population is irrelevant to an author determined to glorify and expand the radical tradition.

Kolko's devil theory of history (with America as the devil) is clearly an inadequate model to describe cold war origins. Yet this Manichaean view, replete with conspiracies and deceptive documents, is accepted by most revisionists with only minor variations. For example, New Left guru Denna Frank Fleming traces cold war origins back to the American failure to join the League of Nations. Revisionists David Horowitz and Gar Alperovitz detect hatred and fear of Russia in America's decision to drop the atomic bomb (see Michael Amrine's indicting review of Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* in *The New York Herald Tribune*, July 18, 1965). Fortunately, few revisionists display the imagination of David Leslie Hoggan, who unmasks British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as a warmonger bullying the pacifist Adolf Hitler.

Bud Folsom

ROSENBLATT

(continued from page 4)

We focus primarily on Mrs. Loud because, like Harriet, she runs her show. She answers everybody's questions, and solves all problems. She arranges airplane tickets, reminds the children of their school calendar, reinforces various routines, even fetches a spoon for her youngest, Michele. She insists on the role of stabilizer and organizer — "I've got enough mutinous troops around here" — and the others concede her that role eagerly. In fact, they make her assumption of it necessary, a fine courtesy, by affecting chaos and disorder at every opportunity. Even when the Louds simply walk together, they lope distractedly, like water birds in an open zoo.

The principal difference between the two women is that Harriet used to urge on the maturity of her boys, to the point of the show's survival through David's and Ricky's marriages. Of ourse, Harriet had the advantage over Pat of being confined by her director to the business of making peanut butter and jelly sandwiches for seven or eight years, and her benign toleration of everybody else's changes was born partly of circumstance. Mrs. Loud, quite openly, does not wish her family to change. When Kevin returns from overseas, he shows signs of independence which Pat resents, and tries to tease him out of. She much prefers her neurotic Lance, who is down and out in Europe and writes home for money. On the phone, Pat tells Bill to wire another fifty, and when Bill protests, "he's got to do it for himself," she treats his comment as an aphorism.

This difference aside, however, Pat and Harriet could play each other. More than any superficial similarity, they share the fundamental condition of being simultaneously the firm foundations of their families and the romantic idols in which great dreams have been invested. Each is her Juno, of O'Casey's play, married to a dreamer and bungler whose wildest dream (and biggest bungle?) was she herself. Now the object of the dream must become the solidifying agent because the dreamer goes on dreaming. The stability of the family depends entirely on her who initially had been the end of romance, and now encourages romance in others (the tap dancers, the

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rock n roll stars) in order to hold on to her power. In Harriet this is theater, in Pat, life, but it is the same part played.

To parallel real and fictitious characters in this way should be an offensive idea. The suggestion it carries is that the real person is diminished by the comparison, her complexities and variations, which are the human signs, reduced to the simplifying elements of melodrama. Yet Pat is not diminished in the slightest by her identification with fiction. Indeed, her complexity is enhanced by it, because she seems purposefully to cultivate the trappings of simple-mindedness, as if she sought to be fictitious herself.

She comes on from the start as a woman who has absorbed all the components of attractiveness without permitting herself to become attractive. Always informal, her white slacks are startling, she gives the impression of having studied long and hard to look so smart. By now her appearance comes automatically, and the outfits which are supposed to be casual are worn like a kind of uniform. She descends to breakfast each morning like a piece of machinery, yet it is clear that she is aware of her rigidity. Instead of working counter to it, she elaborates on it, just as the children elaborate on their own loose-jointedness.

Her props are her glasses. Oversized, stylish, she wears them as a visor. Her voice, (like Harriet's) has the tone of instructions piped through ear phones on a museum tour. Neither warm nor cold, it sustains rather than creates conversation, a family trait. She has thick dark hair which she ties back like a young girl's, but she does not look young because of it. Nor does she look old, nor old trying to look young. She looks as if she were frozen at thirty-five, though she has reached forty-six, yet the question of age does not really crop up. The control she exerts over herself, her body and gestures, so dominates the impression we take of her that in a sense the force of that control, which ordinarily should be repellent for its dehumanizing effect, is her most attractive feature.

But Mrs. Loud will not allow even that attraction. She has mastered the craft of withholding herself: from her clothing, her voice, her homosexual son with whom she plays a perpetual Venus and Adonis. On her visit to Lance in New York, she lolls about his pad like the siren of a world which might have been. Then is off again, to a Baltimore shipping depot, or to a shoe store to buy taps for Delilah, or to a book. When she calls her husband long distance, even before they become officially estranged, she sounds as if it is she who has answered the phone. He tries to pump up their talk, as if with an organ bellows. She gives him the time and the weather.

The terrible thing, or what ought to be the terrible thing, is, as we learn in one of the latter episodes, that Mrs. Loud knows what we think of her. Deciding after twenty years that she will divorce her husband because of his countless infidelities, she brings her case to her brother and sister-in-law. They discuss divorce over a barbecue. Pat says that the pain Bill has put her through has caused her to become "unlovable." The word is not only exactly right, but brings Bill to mind, who is constitutionally lovable. Bill, who does not withhold himself, who was born with a face that takes everything (nothing) seriously, and bears the expression of a man eternally in line for something, like a tv taping. Bill always gives his all, which is also all surface, yet Pat is leaving him for his dishonesty, his disingenuousness, which she says has made her unlovable.

She tells her in-laws that her husband has made his philanderings so obvious to her that she can only suppose that he meant them to be discovered. What she does not say directly is that when she made the discoveries, she reacted to them on her own terms. She ordered Bill from the house on those earlier occasions, and will do so this time as well. She will make a "scene," even though it is not certain that a scene is what Bill was seeking when he so obviously planted the evidence of his guilt. But it is a scene he will get, nevertheless, because a show down, for all its stomping and screaming, will still be in Pat's control. It will require no thinking of anybody, no revelations and no changes. Just like Ozzie caught dancing too close to his old flame at the class reunion, Bill Loud will be in the "dog house."

The divorce of the Louds, the central action of the series, is a great sadness. Why are we so unmoved? Strangely, we would have been more distrubed by the sight of Harriet going through the same experience, sitting down collectedly with Thorny the neighbor, and painfully unburdening herself of her contempt for the simpleton Ozzie, the tedium of his golf playing and boyish fakery, for David, the straight, Wheaties-grown dullard, for Ricky with his narcotized eyes, for her own infernal sandwiches, and their whole vacant, sun-drenched life. Done right, that scene would have stunned us powerfully. But not Pat Loud. When she lays bare her life, it seems as if she is talking about someone else.

This evasion is the heart of her trouble, the heart of all the Louds' troubles. The reason why each of them is interchangeable with some stock counterpart is that the Louds are playing American Family, not living it, just as they had played American Family long before Craig Gilbert, their producer-director, hit upon his brainstorm. I do not mean that the editing of the series has produced an artificial dramatization. I mean that the Louds have done so themselves, have created and managed an imitation of life based on the other imitations which mass culture calls art. The Louds were born a tv program, waiting to be discovered. They always thought of themselves as a family show.

At installment one of the series, Craig Gilbert was careful to point out that he was about to present us with *an*, not *the*, American family. His caveat was both unnecessary and untrue. Nothing could be clearer than that the Louds were chosen for this presentation because of their typicality, because they had teenagers, a suburban life, multiple cars, a swimming pool, because they photographed well, and because they were Californians. They were meant to be identifiable as types, and are so. No one knows this better than the Louds. Yet precisely because the externalities of their lives declare them to be *the* American family, they do not know what it is to be *an* American family, or any kind of family for that matter. They know they are typical, all right, but they believe that people are supposed to be typical.

Where do they get this notion? From popular culture, where else, the very culture they sustain. Cherishing the legend of Lana Turner who was "discovered" as she dangled her legs from a stool in a soda fountain, the Louds too want their children to be discovered. Delilah, the Ann Miller of tomorrow. Grant and Kevin on a golden platter. After all, this is why the Louds agreed to do the series in the first place, to promote the careers of their children, perhaps to be discovered themselves. The Magnificent Louds. The Flying Louds. The sadness of this business is not that the Louds resemble the Nelsons, but that they have been pursuing the Nelsons' reality.

Robert Warshow asked, what use can we make of our experience in a world of mass culture? The answer, as he well knew, is that mass culture produces the art of mass experience, individual experience distended into types and categories which spread over the land confusing and distorting our taste. It is the striving toward fictional normality which has shaped the Louds, torn them asunder, and left them naked before us. Their unconscious pretense is what we feel close to, and cannot bear. □

DR. SCOTT'S ELECTRIC GIRDLE FOR MEN.

Professional men affirm that there is hardly a disease which Electricity and Magnetism will not benefit or cure.

Dr. W. A. HAMMOND, of N. Y., late Surgeon-Gen. of the U. S., an eminent authority, publishes almost miraculous cures made by him with these agencies.



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Correspondence

To the Editor:

I find it singularly unfunny that in your DEATHS column, you should include the mention of the fact that a Mr. Helmer Haakenson drowned in a vat of sauerkraut. Now, if this is pure fabrication, it is unfunny...and if it is the truth, it is **horrendously** unfunny to include it in your column simply because it is weird.

A death, no matter how unusual, is not funny. I am amazed that you obviously think so. As a matter of fact, the inclusion of the demise of **Life** and of the Whooping Cranes in a column on human deaths is a demonstration of extremely poor taste and of a lack of sensitivity. It reminds me of the time some national magazine (hardly a paragon of good taste) included the death of some lion in its column of human deaths and also of the time an Indianapolis paper, in what might serve as the chief example of sick wit, reported on the death of some poor human being who suffered the agonizing death of being gored by a wild boar. The paper captioned the article "Bored to Death"—funny, huh? Well, **The Alternative** seems to be heading in the same direction. The horror of dying in a vat of sauerkraut, or in a vat of molasses, should preclude your including these deaths simply because you apparently think they are funny ways to die. Such lack of taste is appalling.

C. Carylton
St. Louis, Missouri

To the Editor:

One of the book reviews in the March issue brought back memories, the review of **The Superfluous Anarchist.** I knew Nock back in the late twenties and early thirties, knew him as well as anyone could know him, which, in as far as his personal life was concerned, was damn little. We did spend considerable time together; much of what one reads of Nock nowadays—and you do read a great deal about him, a small cult is developing—is very wide of the mark as far as the actual Nock is concerned. He has to be the greatest conversationalist that ever lived. I have sat and listened to him talk six hours at a stretch, over a bottle of Martell's Brandy, and been fascinated every minute of the six hours.

I enjoyed my first issue, congratulations on what you are doing.

Sincerely
Charles C. Dayspring
Santa Barbara, California

To the Editor:

The best thing that can happen in the sale of a product or service, is to have the tradename become a "household" word. This is the main purpose of advertising and corporations spend millions in its accomplishment.

So, I was set to wonder if you might be on the payroll of the Xerox Corp., what with your coining a word, not yet in the dictionary, in an effort, ever so subtly, to make the name "Xerox" synonymous with copy machines; such as "xeroxed," used in the first paragraph of Editorial II, Volume 6, Number 5, for February, 1973.

Why not IBM-ed, or MMM-ed, or Speed-O-Printed, or Apeco-ed, etc., etc.

Of course, this could be called trivial, but it isn't where I am concerned due to the political and ideological make-up of Xerox.

It is my opinion Xerox is committed to making our nation into a socialist state, which I would die to prevent, just as I would die to prevent a Communist Amerika. So why help them?

Ray Edminster
Loma Linda, California

To the Editor:

In **The Alternative** for March Henry Regnery quotes Heinrich Hauser from which I excerpt the the following:

"The Russian occupation . . . has a far better chance to succeed because it may be able to create a hundred percent Communist Germany."

Regnery goes on to state, ". . . Hauser's propositions appear to be manifestly absurd. The Russian occupation zone, now organized as the German Democratic Republic, can hardly be considered a success when compared to the West German Federal Republic."

Regnery misses the point. It is of no importance whether the G.D.R. can hardly be considered a success when compared with the W.G.F.R. What is important is the fact of the **existence** of the G.D.R. This by itself invalidates Regnery's opinion.

Furthermore, the proposition to which he refers as absurd on page 5 is referred to on page 7 in the following terms, "one reason Hauser's prediction may prove to be correct . . . is the equivocal western position toward German reunification."

Is Mr. Regnery playing both ends against the middle?

May I suggest that proofreading should have caught this contradiction?

Walter V. Barth
Ridgewood, New York

To the Editor:

It is with a great sense of regret that I must confess the amusement felt by many Southern conservatives in regard to the hysteria evidenced in the March, 1973 issue of **The Alternative** concerning HEW's policy of affirmative action. Although their schemes have adopted various guises, these same proponents of democratic tribalism have been fighting the folk of the South for many, many years. Until recently the "planners" have directed the entire focus of their crusades at the beleagured people of Dixie but now our comrades in the North are falling prey to "social betterment"...

Your analysis of the effects of affirmative action are quite accurate but have been current in this section of the country for many years—perhaps the question of Reconstruction arises again. The difference between conservatism North and South is that as a basic tenet we include foresight . . .

Live and learn, y'all.

Sincerely Yours
David Adcock
Southern Director, YAF
Durham, North Carolina

To the Editor:

Your review of **Rosa Luxemburg Contraceptive Cooperative** by Leopold Tyrmand, in your February issue, was one fo those rare shocks life delivers to me once in a while from the most unexpected sources. How could Mr. Shorey write so petty and vicious a critique of this wonderful book bothers me less, for I never heard of Mr. Shorey and had no opinion of him, other than the fact that Mr. Emmett Tyrrell has published it in his fine magazine.

I still don't know what it is that disturbs Mr. Shorey so much about this book (is it that Mr. Tyrmand so openly admits to hating Communism, or that he is still able to poke fun at it as no one has ever done before him; both of these "sins" seem to unnerve some of our conservatives who believe the subject must always be treated with great pomp, seriousness and "impartiality") and I don't care. But his references to Tyrmand's "godawful style" take the cake. **The New Yorker,** for all its regrettable ideological stand, is still the damn best literary magazine in this country, and **The New Yorker** has published many of Mr. Tyrmand's articles and excerpts of his book. So did many other first rate magazines...

Whatever Mr. Shorey's faults as a book critic, and there are many, this is beside the point. What is not is that a book which in spite of its openly anti-Communist stand received raving reviews from such diverse publications as **The New York Post, The Wall Street Journal,** and **National Review,** a book that so aptly tells us things we cannot learn anywhere else - not guesses or fiction, but an intelligent and witty first-hand account of life in Poland under Communism—a book of this kind deserved a better fate than this immature, confused, and inept treatment, if it were to be reviewed at all . . .

Sincerely,
Mrs. Anna Wortheim
New York, New York

To the Editor:

"The Alternative"? About the only thing your despicable rag is an alternative to is common decency and a sense of responsibility for self-knowledge and your fellow man's well-being.

Throughout your latest (Jan '73) effort you display the essence of William Buckley conservatism-rhetoric which is cleverly written enough to defy quotation out of context but which, taken as a whole, is nothing more (or less) than sophisticated John Birch-ism. Aside from this saving journalistic grace, you display the classic Neanderthal Conservatism which rails against state intervention in private affairs, sex education, decency in politics and every other time-honored Sacred Cow of the Goldwater-Agnew crowd; in so doing you conveniently ignore the Vietnam bloodbath, hunger in this country (see editorial) and elsewhere, and the fact that your cherished traditions of free enterprise have dismally failed to serve basic human needs for ALL of the people [8] and that, gentlemen, is what all of your corrupt institutions were ostensibly created to do.

You might consider yourselves the "wave of the future." I can only be thankful that the sands of time will absorb the destructive energy you represent. Go and spend a day watching some surf come in, and you'll begin to appreciate what that analogy really means. Even better, I suggest you try going out on the land for a time, and know the feelings of the Earth better; then, return to your offices rejuvenated, retain the title of your "publication," and use it as an information forum for REAL Alternative living. Becoming "a part of the pervasive movement towards liberated living that threatens to erode the heart of our Country's greatness" can be very self-fulfilling (in contrast to your present unfortunate position) and lots of fun, too. Try it. You'll like it.

Alternatively Yours
Patrick Bosold
San Francisco, California

To the Editor:

The following has recently been brought to my attention, by a youngish thirty-year-old gentleman who, upon receiving a subscription to your magisterial publication for Christmas (from me!), noticed a slight error. Bluntly stating that he did not want to be considered a picker of nit, he nevertheless thought justified in making a comment of some sort.

We do not dispute the date of the founding of **The Alternative,** but turn your attention to the founding made "over a cheap domestic beer." Again, we do not dispute the fact that the beverage might have been cheap. We only wish to have it known that McSorly's does not serve beer. McSorly's Ale House is indeed an **ale** house. Ale is a malt beverage, darker, heavier, and more bitter than beer (Random House College Dictionary).

Not being a women's libber, I myself have never been inside McSorley's, neither do I care to break tradition. I simply remain outside while my date relieves his thirst (sigh!). I only relay this information for the sole purpose of correcting what seems to be an ever so slight misrepresentation.

With fond regards,
Miss Hope Wislosky
New York, N.Y.

Dear Miss Hope Wislosky:

Thank you for your scholarly research. Your point is well-taken. Our own investigation, however, finds that McSorly's Ale House does indeed serve a beverage known as porter, and porter, Miss Hope, is a kind of beer, of a dark brown color and a bitterish taste, brewed from malt partly charred or browned by drying at a high temperature (Oxford English Dictionary).

It was first brewed in 1750 by a certain Ralph Harwood at the Bector's Brewhouse on the east side of High Street in Shoreditch, England. All of us here at The Establishment have given Ralph a short prayer of thanks. He saved this magazine from an embarrassing pickle.

—Ed.

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Book Review

How CBS Tried to Kill a Book

by Edith Efron
Nash, $6.95

To understand this book one must be somewhat familiar with CBS's alleged victim, Miss Efron's first book, *The News Twisters (TNT)*. According to *TNT*, during the seven weeks prior to the 1968 presidential election, network news tended to be "strongly biased in favor of the Democratic-liberal-left axis of opinion, and strongly biased against the Republican-conservative-right axis of opinion."

Although this allegation of left-liberal bias was not new, Miss Efron received much attention because she was the first to document her charges by means of statistical analysis. CBS News president Richard Salant recognized the importance of *TNT* and on October 11, 1971—the same day *TNT* was published—issued a statement attempting to refute Miss Efron's findings.

According to Mr. Salant, *The News Twisters* "examines only a limited part of network coverage. It does so with a distinct bias which produces gross distortions of fact. It uses statistical procedures which are seriously flawed. And it draws erroneous, prejudiced, and unsupportable conclusions." As documentation for these statements, Salant appended to his release a CBS Study of *TNT* and an analysis of Efron methodology.

The Salant release and appended stuies were, according to Miss Efron, the major weapons CBS employed in its attempt to "kill" *The News Twisters*. *How CBS Tried to Kill a Book*, then, is Miss Efron's defense of *TNT* and her answers to the CBS charges.

The CBS Study makes seventeen charges against *The News Twisters*, including direct challenges to nine of the cases cited by Miss Efron. Although this number seems small when compared to the more than 300 stories Miss Efron analyzed, they gain significance when CBS tells us they are the result of a random sampling, a "spot check." They lose their significance again when we discover that, despite CBS's claim, they in fact are *not* the result of a random check.

Had the CBS examples been the result of a random sampling of the Efron data, and had they been valid criticisms, CBS probably would have succeeded in "killing" *The News Twisters* and most people would have adjudged the network's action as justifiable homicide. Unfortunately for CBS, *TNT* is still alive and Edith Efron is screaming murder. Though presented in a sometimes complex, sometimes emotional manner, Miss Efron's case is sound.

The bulk of *How CBS Tried to Kill A Book* is devoted to refuting the specific CBS charges against *TNT* and showing that the CBS Study was anything but a "spot check." Although a case-by-case comparison of the CBS charges and Miss Efron's rebuttals is beyond the scope of this review, it is obvious that Miss Efron is correct: the CBS Study was *not* the result of a random sampling.

A random sample, by definition, must include a sampling from all the original data. The CBS spot check did not do this. In fact, it totally ignored what Miss Efron calls "the bulk of *TNT*'s findings," the huge mass of opinion voiced by people other than the newscasters. In the period Miss Efron studied, this non-editorial opinion made up 69 percent of the opinion heard on CBS. Yet the CBS spot check failed to deal with any of it. It should be pointed out that this type of opinion is very simple and straightforward. Consisting of items such as "Muskie praises Humphrey as an impressive man" (CBS, 10-4-68) and "Eldridge Cleaver opposes the war" (CBS, 10-31-68), non-editorial opinion is generally easy to classify as "pro" or "con" and easy to refute if wrongly classified. CBS made no attempt to refute this mass of documentation.

Despite claims to the contrary, the CBS Study was not a spot check of the Efron data and it did not refute the Efron findings. It was merely CBS's attempt to defend itself against legitimate criticism. That the defense was weak is interesting, but the more crucial question is why CBS even attempted to defend itself if the best defense it could come up with was one based on intellectual dishonesty? After all, CBS did have other options. It could have admitted the bias, and made attempts to correct it. Or it could have ignored the charges as the other networks seem to have done. Instead it chose to, well, to lie.

I don't pretend to know the answer to this question. But one thing is certain. The question of television news bias is an important one which has ramifications throughout all of society. When a network chooses to treat the question as CBS has, it is doing a great disservice to society

Baron Von Kannon



CONTINUING CRISIS

(continued from page 2)

● World tension eased a bit when word came from Bathurst that Gambia and North Korea have decided to establish diplomatic relations. Radio Brazzaville has reported that Congolese head of state, Major Marien Ooof Ngouabi has won the Medal for Anti-imperialist Struggle — last year Major Ngouabi returned his nation's only Coca-Cola vending machine to the C.I.A. after personally casting a hex on it. But UNESCO startled citizens of the world when it revealed that the Malagasy Republic contains about 2.4 million illiterates over the age of fifteen in its total population of 7.8 million. In East Germany police arrested Mr. Hans Pfeat, a twenty-four-year-old farmer, for stealing two truck loads of cow manure from a Pomeranian dairy. And in yet another attempt to stamp out antisocial behavior, Albanian police executed the Reverend Stephen Kurti, a Roman Catholic priest, for surreptitiously baptizing an innocent child.

● March 27 was a mixed day for Mr. Richard Cory of San Francisco, California. Early in the day he escaped from a prison in San Jose. Later in the day while browsing through San Francisco International Airport, he answered a page from the airport telephone operator, and the gendarme clapped the blockhead back in the calaboose. Spokane police reported 186 pounds of laughing gas stolen from a warehouse, and the Governor of Michigan

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presided over the mass burial of several thousand pounds of spoiled mushrooms.

● Food prices continued to soar. In February consumer prices rose 0.8 percent led by food prices which rose 2.4 percent. Sensing a portentous stirring amongst consumers the President imposed price controls on meat. The American Social Health Association announced that the U.S. production of gonorrhea had reached a record high last year. And in Chicago Mr. Leonard Lampton won the third annual peanut butter eating championship held at Quigley North High School. Meanwhile Chicago's Mayor Richard J. Daley aroused the city's fiscal conservatives by ordering the elimination of all municipally owned comfort stations, whereupon *The Chicago Tribune* sponsored a contest to devise a suitable monument in his honor. Of course, some areas of the country are being harder hit by the spastic economy than are others. In Fairfax, Virginia an indurated judge, the Rt. Hon. Martin E. Morris, condemned a seventy-eight-year-old man to thirty days in the cooler for cohabiting with five hundred chickens in his rural four-room house. High prices forced the Agriculture Department to stop buying canned luncheon meat for some 2.6 million needy people. And in a protest of high food prices, informed sources say that Mrs. George McGovern is serving dinner guests salads of tossed lichens and cobwebs. Nevertheless these have been boom times for some Americans, and two New York travel agencies announced tours aimed especially at the homosexual market.

● On March 29, as the last American troops flew out of South Vietnam, the last American POW's left Hanoi. However, American planes did continue to bomb communist forces in Cambodia, and communists did continue hostile ground actions in South Vietnam. And no sooner did the last American POW's leave Hanoi than those POW's now at home began telling of grizzly tortures at the hands of their erstwhile captors. Apparently those who did not sign some kind of confession or greet Jane Fonda were continuously tortured and some perished. But while many POW's were roasting the anti-war activists for their Hanoi visits, they were receiving the old raspberries from Miss Jane Fonda, whose philosophical retort was that "History will judge them severely." All of this of course seems to indicate that the war is officially over. Mr. Dick Gregory, who had renounced solid foods in protest of the war, can go back to beefsteak, and Leonard and Felicia Bernstein, who had given up brushing their teeth, can return Western Civilization to their mouths.

● The Supreme Court decided that school systems can be financed in part by property taxes, and that in certain small elections local governments can restrict voting to property owners. The Senate Judiciary Committee continued to tighten its noose around the neck of Mr. Nixon's garrulous nominee for F.B.I. director, L. Patrick Gray, III. And, while six of the Watergate Seven were being sentenced, the seventh, Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., began to sing. Before he finished, he had implicated no less than five more Republicans in the Watergate Affair, an event that may have involved a cast of thousands. As the revelations come tumbling forth it becomes abundantly manifest that not just Mr. McCord and his pathetic band, but all Americans share the blame for Watergate. Alas, America awaits its Gibbon! □

"THE ARMED OCCUPATION of Wounded Knee is a welcome shot in the arm for the campus lecture circuit. Both the Black Panthers and the Chicago Seven are now a bit passé, and audiences are already bored with Angela Davis. Lesbians and astrologers have not been drawing. But can you imagine what fees people like AIM leader Dennis Banks will command, once this caper is over and they hit the greenback trail?"

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August 10, 1974 marks the 100th anniversary of the birth in West Branch, Iowa of the 31st President of the United States, Herbert Hoover. As part of a year-long centennial observance, the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association is pleased to announce this essay contest made possible by a grant from the Garvey Foundation, Wichita, Kansas.

Eligibility

Applicants must be citizens of the United States or Canada born in 1944 or later. Essays are limited to 4,000 words. Applications must be submitted by June 1, 1973. Deadline for entries is September 15, 1973. Selection of winners will be made by members of the Mont Pelerin Society and announced by January 15, 1974.

For information and application blanks write:
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Current Wisdom

"Whom the gods destroy they first make mad"– Euripides

ZOOLOGY

I. F. Stone remarks on the Great Republic's greatest achievement:

We got ourselves a moral monster for a President.

—The New York Review of Books

LET GEORGE SAY IT

In the calm of a post-election interview George McGovern, the Lion of South Dakota, proffers his sober appraisal of the choice of 60 percent of America's voters:

I won't go so far as to say he's insane. I will go so far as to say I find his behavior peculiar.

—The London Times

CONSCIOUSNESS RAISING

A revealing glimpse into the intellectual world of the modern American female offered by the liberated women at the new Chicago Tribune:

One of the first thoughts a woman probably has after she learns she is going to have a baby is how this will affect her wardrobe. When my pregnancy was confirmed seven weeks into the term, I was sure my figure was going to blossom out the following week, leaving me with nothing to fit my expanding girth. I ran out and bought two outfits, for more than $80, which weren't worn until my seventh month because they were so maternity looking. Try not to make the same mistake.

—The Chicago Tribune

HEALTH AND HAPPINESS

Mr. Jim Bishop, America's equivalent to the Oracle of Delphi, reveals seventeen secret exercises to be performed upon awakening so as to keep a step ahead of the angels of death. Carlyle Hall, who first performed these occult gesticulations, is still swinging at 98:

1. Pulling my hair, massaging scalp. 2. Vigorous massaging of face. Vigorous massaging of neck, back and front. 4. Turning of head to right and left. 5. Pulling ear lobes.

6. Raising head up and down. 7. Place arms alongside body and twist. 8. Whip arms up and down vigorously. 9. Lock hands over chest, move back and forth. 10. Cross arms over chest, lift upward and downward.

11. Keep arms crossed, move right and left. 12. Grasp bedpost, move body right and left. 13. Open and close jaws six times. 14. Take seven deep breaths. 15. Rest a moment.

16. Stretch legs and arms; hold them. 17. Raise leg up, lock hands over knee, pull legs up to chin, spreading them out as you do it.

—King Features Syndicate

ONE MINUTE TO MIDNIGHT

The valiant Progressive sounds the call for all hands on deck. We live in a time of calamity and worse—thank God for calamity! It keeps morons at their typewriters and off the streets:

Two fragile and fallible institutions—the Congress and the press—stand in the way of incipient fascism. Both are likely to be subjected to inordinate pressures in the months and years to come. Both deserve every ounce of support the people can provide, for we will be needing them as we never have before. To the extent that they expose, debate, and resist, democracy in America will be preserved. To the extent that they knuckle under, it will be lost. For the moment, we are waist-deep in the quagmire of despotism. And sinking.

—The Progressive

GREAT EXPECTATIONS

Mr. Wilfrid Sheed, Bishop without portfolio, reveals the trivial state of his moral life:

To some of us, this war is the greatest sin we ever expect to find ourselves involved in, and our private spiritual lives are comparatively trivial next to the task of stopping it.

—Wilfred Sheed

VOYAGES IN ENGLISH

The perils of linguistic experimentation in the Nixonian Age:

Postal inspectors have moved against *The Daily Rag*—a local anti-establishment newspaper, for displaying on the cover of its current issue a popular four-letter Anglo-Saxonism that officials view as unlawfully obscene.

—The Washington Post

THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE

An auspicious new political alignment in progressive Massachusetts as reported to history by one of that state's engage gazettes:

Directors of the Greater Lynn Mental Health Association have voted to publicly support the City of Lynn's Rent Control Program.

In taking this action, the Mental Health Association said that "unreasonable rent increases and substandard housing are sources of stress for many Lynn residents and contributors to mental illness."

The Greater Lynn Mental Health Association viewed the action as part of its efforts to prevent the incidence of mental illness in the Greater Lynn area by working to reduce the sources of stress in the lives of individuals.

— Daily Evening Item
Lynn, Massachusetts

GALLIMAUFRY OF HEART

No, no, the ensuing passage is not from the diary of the incomparable Arthur Bremmer but from the pages of the incomparable New York Review of Books:

When Richard Nixon walked onto the inaugural stand — it was the first time I had seen him in the flesh and I was only twenty yards away from him, in the second row of the press section — I began to weep. I don't know precisely why.

Francine du Plessix Gray
The New York Review of Books

THE ALL-AMERICAN HIND

These unexpurgated musings of Mr. Bill Walton, a six foot, eleven inch metaphysician from UCLA's sweat shop, reveal the precious state of virtue, beauty, and intellectuality in college sport:

When UCLA started practice for the 1972—1973 season, Walton said:

"I enjoy basketball. It's a game, isn't it? That's what it's called. And everyone likes to play games. Games are for having fun. When my bad knees are acting up, it's no fun. And I wonder why those who aren't playing find it so much fun. I wonder why our fans will stand outside for hours just to get into Pauley Pavilion and then, when they're inside, go stark raving mad over us. I laugh at them. I can't believe them.

"Money doesn't mean anything to me," he says. "It can't buy happiness, and I just want to be happy. I'm built for basketball and I have the potential to be a top player, but I'm not sure that I want it for a profession."

"I think I'd rather become a criminal lawyer and offer a free service to those in the ghettos who are discriminated against by our society. I could make more of a contribution to mankind that way than by basketball or by giving away the money I'd make. And I want to do more with my life than win a few games.

"I'm just starting in sports, and already I'm being called a superstar. It's just not right. I don't like it when everyone wants to interview me and no one pays any attention to my teammates. Without them I'd be nothing. This is a team game, and I'm just one of the guys on our team. I think I've gotten twice as much publicity as I deserve because I'm the 'Great White Hope' in a game that has been dominated by blacks.

"If I were black, I would be just another center who plays well. In basketball, I want to be judged for my play, not my color. I don't deserve any medals for my color. I'm white and I wouldn't blame the blacks if they took up arms and went into outright revolt. If a black man drove by and gunned me down right now, I'd figure it was all right because of what whites have done to blacks."

— Newsday

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FERRELL

(continued from page 13)

posed "elections," but Rhee refused to go along. "By June, 1950, a series of desperate needs had come together. Mr. Truman had to have a crisis to sell the NSC 68 program of a huge U.S. military buildup. Chiang could not hold on, nor could Rhee, without an American commitment; the U.S. Air Force and Navy needed a justification to retain their bases in Japan; the Democrats had to prove that they could get tough with the Communists. Most of all, the Americans had to establish themselves on the mainland before the white man was driven out of Asia and its islands forever. The needs were met on June 25, 1950."[65]

Leaving this pipe dream to the author or authors of a later edition of Richard S. Kirkendall's *The Truman Period as a Research Field*, it is more gratifying to make a second observation about cold war revisionism, namely, that the revisionists have not proved a single one of their points, no great achievement for a group of scholars who now have been working for several years and have not been bashful about revealing their conclusions.

A third estimate of cold war revisionism is that while the revisionists doubtless will busy themselves with the Far East for two or three years they are now facing extinction as a breed. They have been able in fair part to present their interpretations because the American archives have not been open, but those archives presumably are now going to open soon. Mr. Nixon this year (1972) has instructed the Department of State and other government departments to assist the scholars in the Department's Historical Office in bringing *Foreign Relations* rapidly up to a twenty-year line, meaning that the archives then might well be open not merely through the Truman period but into the Eisenhower period. Historians will have much to do, for in regard to the Truman Administration the judgment of David S. McLellan and John W. Reuss of 1966 still stands, that studies are needed for almost all of the administration's most basic policies and problems — Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Berlin blockade, NATO, Korean War.[66]

In final conclusion, becoming somewhat philosophical, it is worth saying that whatever the occasional results, whether the past has been used or not, it is a good thing that American historians have taken so much interest in recent American foreign policy. There is an admirable tradition among political scientists and historians in this country that the present and the near-present is too important to be left to the journalists. Consider the attitudes of British and Continental historians, for whom history ended with Napoleon. An American student in London apparently was told some years ago, by an official at one of the offices set up to help visiting American scholars, that history ended in 1815, and if the student wished to know about events of recent times he perhaps could inquire at the London School of Economics where some strange people were at work. Such a point of view would be incomprehensible in this country, and it is even becoming less accepted in England. For American scholars in recent years it has been saddening to see the nation get into trouble in Vietnam, but most of them have continued to believe that by and large the national record of foreign policy has been a good one, and at no time more so than during the Truman Administration. In the next few years both doubters and believers will have an opportunity to see for themselves. □

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65. "The Failure of a Policy Rooted in Fear."

66. "Foreign and Military Policies," in **The Truman Doctrine as a Research Period** (Columbia, Mo., 1967), pp. 15-85.



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

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